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of Formal Software Models
by Dejan Desovski

Abstract
Formal methods for verification of software systems often face the problem of state
explosion and complexity. We present a divide and conquer methodology that leads to
component based verification and analysis of formal requirements specifications
expressed using Software Cost Reduction (SCR) models. The proposed methodology has
the following steps: model partitioning, partition verification (either by model checking
or testing) and composition of verification results.
We define a novel decomposition methodology for SCR specifications based on
min-cut graph algorithms. The methodology identifies components in given SCR
specifications and automates related abstraction methods. It also provides guidance on
how to perform verification and validation of the formal system models. Further, we
present a strategy for verification of modular and decomposable software models.
Efficient verification of SCR models is achieved with the use of invariants and proof
compositions.
SCR specifications can be executed by the simulator and tested, either
automatically (e.g. random testing) or manually, guided by a domain expert using visual
interface mimicking the actual system. Some of the identified specification components
might be simple enough to allow thorough testing, despite having large state spaces that
cause problems with model checking approaches. We define model test coverage
measures and develop tools to track the achieved coverage during manual and random
testing. Testing and coverage measures provide degree of assurance in the component
correctness. Our experimental results also provide insight into the efficacy of random
testing approaches for verification of software models.
Experimental validation of our methodology brought to light several concepts that
have been advocated in the software development community for a long time:
modularity, encapsulation, information hiding and the avoidance of global variables. The
advantages of the compositional verification strategy are demonstrated in the case study,
which analyses the Personnel Access Control System. Our approach offers significant
savings in terms of time and memory requirements needed to perform formal system
verification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

By definition, a high assurance system is a system for which compelling evidence is
required to demonstrate that it delivers its services in a manner that satisfies certain
critical properties. Consequently, during the development of a high assurance system we
must prove that it does not contain any faults or, if that is out of our reach, that failures
are highly unlikely to occur.
High assurance software systems continue to pose significant challenges for verification
and validation. Software industry relies mostly on informal methods (e.g., code review or
testing) for quality assurance purposes. However, even the most experienced quality
assurance engineers can often overlook faults.
Formal methods hold a promise for the development of provably correct software
applications. Despite enthusiasm in the research community, formal methods are rarely
used in software industry. Continual complaints regarding the difficulty of applying them
to practical software applications are due, in part, to scalability problems. The challenges
of formal approaches are caused by the large state-spaces and the complexity of any
practical software application. The automated formal methodologies, such as model
checking, often hit the state-space explosion barrier, while the approaches involving
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theorem proving require advanced skills and knowledge. Several techniques have been
researched to combat the complexity and state-space explosion. For example, partial
order reduction [58], abstractions [12][23], assume guarantee reasoning [69] and other
approaches have been proposed, but practical applications of formal methods to real-life
software systems remain as uncommon as they were a decade ago.
In order to apply formal methods, the underlying software model must be recorded in
some form of a formal notation. For our research purposes, we selected the mature
Software Cost Reduction (SCR) requirements specification methodology [9]. Typical
SCR requirement specification consists of two parts. The operational part describes
system operation, while the property-based part encodes the logical and temporal
properties that the system must satisfy in operation. SCR tables in the operational part
represent the system as a finite state machine, while the properties are first order logic
formulas representing state or transition (two-state) invariants which must hold for the
system. Having this separation makes it possible to perform verification and detect
possible inconsistencies using formal methods like theorem proving or model checking.
When we talk about “verification” in the remainder of the dissertation, we are referring
to the formal consistency verification between the stated properties and the operational
description of a given system.
The role of the properties is similar to the notion of checklist used for certification of
systems in other engineering disciplines. If all items (properties) on the checklist are
satisfied, the system is certified for use; if not the engineer must present sufficient
evidence that they are true so that the system can become certified. Consequently, this list
must be complete in the sense that it must contain all needed properties that establish the
correctness of the system.
Proving the correctness of these formal software models is one of the most challenging
tasks in the development of High Assurance Systems. Validation – (showing that we have
modeled the right system) is usually done by simulation or testing, if the model is
executable, or by manual inspection otherwise, using the human cognitive process to
bridge the gap between the formal representation and system itself. Verification, i.e.,
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ensuring that the implementation meets the requirements, is usually done by applying a
formal method, like model checking or theorem proving. Combing both procedures, the
formal analysis and execution-based testing, for the purpose of validation and verification
of software models has been an area of active research for almost a decade, but few
practical results emerged.
Since software requirements specifications are on a higher level of abstraction than the
code, it is easier to perform different types of analyses. However, large practical
requirements specifications still face state space explosion and complexity problems.
When the formalism is executable, as the operational part of SCR is, it is also feasible to
perform simulation and testing as means of validating the specification. Jointly, various
verification and validation methods can complement each other in reaching sufficient
level of confidence in system correctness.

1.1. Development of High Assurance Systems
The development of High Assurance systems (Figure 1) can be divided in three phases.
The first one is Formalization Phase, when we map informal problem description
(usually given in natural language) into formal framework (some mathematical
constructs), and it is completed when a formal specification has been obtained. The
second phase is the Implementation Phase, when we use the formal specification to
obtain executable code. The third phase is Testing and Analysis, where we would like to
prove that the specification correctly captures all user requirements, and that the
developed code is correct with respect to the specification. If any errors are discovered,
they must be traced back to their origin (specification or implementation) and corrected.
Proving the correctness of the developed formal specification with respect to the
requirements is one of the most important and most difficult tasks in this process. Studies
have shown that significant number of faults in real systems can be traced back to the
requirements specifications [48].
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Since both the specification and the implementation are formal objects (they have precise
and well-defined semantics), it is possible, in principle, to formally verify the correctness
of the implementation with respect to the specification by using mathematical proof
techniques. Alternatively, we can use formal rewriting and transformation systems in
order to “translate” the formal specification in some high level programming language
like C or Java [26].
However, we can never be sure that the formalization phase has been done correctly in
the first place. This uncertainty arises from the fact that the formalization process maps
informal knowledge into a formal framework.

Informal
Problem
Description

Problem
Understanding

Formal Side
Precise
Description

Validation
Verification

Problem
Solving

Implementation

Figure 1: Development of a High Assurance System.

The basis of our approach is the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) formal representation
and its finite state model of the system. SCR specifications deal with reactive systems
that monitor variables in the environment and react accordingly changing the controlled
variables in a single step. There are no explicit loops in the control flow, except for one
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main loop, which iterates reading monitored variables and producing the control
variables.
The SCR software specifications can be executed by the existing SCR simulator and
tested - either automatically (e.g. random testing) or manually, guided by a domain expert
using visual interface mimicking the actual system. The application of testing to the
specifications, early in the lifecycle, is more cost effective than testing the actual
implementation because removing the errors in the implementation is more expensive.

1.2. Using Visual Interfaces for Validation
To date, most validation techniques are highly biased towards calculations involving
symbolic representations of problems. These calculations are either formal (in the case of
consistency and completeness checks), or informal (in the case of code inspections). We
believe that an essential type of “evidence” of the correctness of the formalization
process must be provided by human-based calculation, because humans formulate and
understand the original problem. We further believe that human calculation can be
significantly amplified by shifting from symbolic representation to graphical
representations.
Another issue in the formalization phase is the domain expert’s understanding of the
formal specification. Often the domain expert does not have the expertise in the specific
form of formal notation and cannot validate whether the formal specification really
captures all desired features of the system correctly.
By using visualization of the system model, it is possible to graphically present the
functional capabilities and behavior captured in the formal specification. Using this
representation, the correctness of the system model can be validated by human
inspection, much in the same way that the mathematically structured formulas are
validated by human inspection. Our belief is that human intuition and understanding will
be much more effective with respect to a visual representation, than it would be in a
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mathematical domain. The domain experts can interact with the visual interface of the
specification and perform tests and simulation runs in order to check if it captures the
desired system behavior. Animation of certain important properties can provide further
evidence in the correctness of the model [71].

1.3. Component-based Approach for Verification
We present a methodology for automated decomposition and abstraction of SCR
specifications. The main hypothesis is that components of complex system specifications
can be identified at the points of minimal coupling (minimal control and/or information
exchange). By applying graph-theoretic min-cut algorithms, we can identify these points
and decompose the specification. The smaller components might be amenable to testing
and based on the coverage achieved by the executed tests, we explore how to abstract
these parts of the specification. The rest of the specification could be exposed to formal
analysis, such as model checking or theorem proving. The abstraction reduces the number
of states that need to be checked by an automated verification technique and helps in
avoiding the state explosion problem, which occurs in traditional model checking.
Automated specification decomposition remains one of the most elusive research goals.
An approach to specification decomposition has been presented in [6]. The authors
propose an algorithm for slicing system specifications represented with Colored Petri
Nets. Slicing the specification improves the understanding of the complex system models
and helps with identifying high-risk components early in the life cycle. The underlying
ideas of [6] are similar to our approach. We want to decompose complex system
specifications into smaller parts with manageable complexity. Instead of ad-hoc
decomposition criteria, we propose using minimum coupling. In other words, our
approach to decomposition creates system components such that they have minimal
coupling (information exchange and/or control connectivity) with the rest of the system.
Several abstraction and slicing criteria for SCR have been proposed in [12]. We
demonstrate how min-cut graph algorithms can be used to decompose SCR
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specifications, as well as to automate the specific SCR abstraction method. Proposed
methodology provides automated abstraction of “irrelevant” monitored variables and
provides guidance on how to perform verification and validation of system models.
Consequently, domain and specification experts can focus their formal verification efforts
on the identified components, combine the results and provide evidence regarding the
correctness of the system as a whole. We present the underlying theory and propose a
strategy for verification of decomposable SCR requirements specifications for efficient
verification of SCR models.
The main goals of the dissertation are identifying the principles that enable componentbased compositional verification, providing a strategy for verification of decomposable
SCR specifications, and demonstrating the advantages of this approach. We also present
our ideas on combining different verification methodologies, namely component model
checking and random testing, by proposing a property checklist based verification
approach.

1.4. Contributions
In our research, we have performed the following tasks:
1)

Studied different approaches to decompose formal specification models;

2)

Investigated the underlying theory for compositional verification of SCR models,
which provides sound rules for combination of the component verification results;

3)

Investigated the use of visualization approaches for validation and developed
techniques for visualization of SCR requirements specifications;

4)

Investigated the induced structural coverage by testing of formal models and built
tools for measuring the structural coverage of simulations and random testing of
software models;

5)

Demonstrated the effectiveness of the component-based verification approach for
decomposable requirements specifications on a case study.
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This is the set of the original contributions:
1)

Development of a divide and conquer methodology for verification and validation
of decomposable SCR requirements specifications, which involves testing and
formal approaches;

2)

Developed a novel decomposition methodology for SCR requirements
specifications, based on min-cut graph algorithms, which is used to identify
components in the specifications and provide guidance for validation and
verification;

3)

Identified the underlying principles for writing modular software requirements
specifications, which in turn are decomposable;

4)

Techniques for visualization of SCR specifications and monitoring of induced
structural test coverage.

1.5. Dissertation Structure
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we give a brief overview of the
related work. Chapter 3 gives the background on which this dissertation relies and
presents a motivational example that is used throughout the exposition. Chapter 4
presents the proposed decomposition methodology and the strategy for component-based
verification of high assurance systems. The testing and coverage of software models is
presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we present the ideas on using Visual Interfaces for
validation purposes and how different visualization tools can be used together with the
SCR toolset. The case study of the NSA Personnel Access Control System SCR
specification is given in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation giving summary
of the accomplishments and providing future directions for research.
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Chapter 2. Related Work

Chapter 2
Related Work

Proving the correctness of software programs has been the holy grail of Computer
Science and Software Engineering. One of the pioneering works in this area is 1969
C.A.R. Hoare's paper [7] on proving correctness of sequential programs. Hoare presents a
formal axiomatic system by which programs can be proved to be correct with respect to
assertions about the values of their input and output variables. In order to prove
correctness of the program loops in these simple “Pascal” like languages, the verifier
must devise a loop invariant. Hoare in [7] states:
“The practice of supplying proofs for nontrivial programs will not become widespread
until considerably more powerful proof techniques become available, and even then will
not be easy.”
Since that time, the complexity of the software we use in everyday lives has escalated,
rendering Hoare's method inapplicable. For nearly all programs it is impossible to show
that they contain no faults because of their complexity. What we strive for is to show that
the probability of latent faults in a software artifact is very low, or the occurrence of
failures is highly unlikely.

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 2: Related Work

10

Software Reliability as a discipline dates back to the 1970’s. In [28] Musa et al. define
software reliability as: “the probability of failure-free operation of a computer program
for a specified time in a specified environment.” Many time-domain models have been
proposed for the estimation of software reliability. They use the failure history obtained
during testing to predict the actual reliability of the program. The assumption behind
these models is that the testing is performed in accordance with a given operational
profile. Some of the fundamental problems with these models are the difficulty obtaining
the “correct” operational profile, variability of the results based on the assumed
operational profile, and the fact that they often overestimate the reliability because of
observed saturation in the testing process. Some current approaches in this research field
propose incorporating code coverage metrics of the testing process into the reliability
model [44][72] in order to avoid some of the mentioned problems. However, for high
assurance systems, this approach is not appropriate because the goal of verification is to
estimate the reliability of the system independent of the operational profile (even highly
unlikely modes of operation should be shown to be highly reliable).
Software testing is used to demonstrate reliability and to detect errors in the developed
code. Testing has been used since the early days of programming, and it is still the most
commonly used quality assurance technique. It involves generation of test suites and
executing the code on them. Testing can be also performed on the specification model, in
order to detect errors in the formalization phase. The main disadvantage with software
testing is that it is not exhaustive - it helps in detecting program errors but it is likely to
miss some of them.
The amount of work that has been done in the area of software verification and validation
is overwhelming. In this chapter we will just present related work on which this
dissertation is based. Section 2.1. talks about Software Testing. Section 2.2. presents
Model Checking and advances in this area like Abstraction and Compositional Methods.
Section 2.3. presents results in using theorem proving for software verification.
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2.1. Software Testing and Coverage Measures
Usual assumption in the software reliability community is that code coverage achieved by
testing is correlated with the reliability of a program [43][53][65]. In practice it has been
observed that defect coverage and test coverage grow over time. However, this
relationship is complicated [37] and no simple correlation has been found to date.
Answering this question is important because it would justify test coverage monitoring
for the purposes of reliability estimation.

Different coverage measures have been defined for the purpose of assessing the adequacy
of software testing procedures [66][70]. Some of the well known coverage measures are
statement, branch and path coverage. Statement coverage is defined as the number of
different statements exercised by test cases. Complete statement coverage requires each
statement of the code to be executed by at least one test case. Branch coverage is defined
by the number of transfer of control (branch) statements executed by the test suite.
Complete branch coverage is usually considered to be the minimal testing requirement. It
is easy to see that branch coverage subsumes statement coverage, i.e. complete branch
coverage implies complete statement coverage. Most comprehensive coverage measure is
path coverage, which requires all possible paths in the code to be executed. It subsumes
both previous testing strategies (complete statement, and complete branch coverage).
Complete path coverage is usually infeasible, because even small programs can have
infinite number of paths, primarily because of the loops.

Other coverage measures have been defined to fill in the gap between path coverage and
branch coverage. Data flow testing selects paths based on definitions and uses of the
variables in the program. A variable is defined when it is assigned a value in a specific
statement. Afterwards, every statement that uses the defined variable belongs to the use
set. The uses of the variables can be divided in P-uses (predicate uses, branch conditions),
or C-uses (computation uses, I/O or calculations involving the variable). Based on
definition-clear paths of the variables (a path between a definition and a use of a variable
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in which the variable does not receive a new value in some intermittent node) we can
define other coverage measures such as All-uses, All-DU-paths, All-Def, All-C-Some-P,
All-P-Some-C, All-P coverage [66]. There are many other coverage measures [80]
including: structured path testing, boundary-interior path testing, strategies based on
linear code sequence and jump, MC/DC, etc.

Testing strategies are very difficult to compare, primarily because most of them are
defined ad-hoc and without theoretical foundations. The usefulness of the “subsumes”
relationship between different coverage measures has been highly contested in literature
[25][62] observing that most of the strategies are incomparable under subsumption, and it
provides no quantitative measure of the effectiveness even for the ordered criteria. Other
comparison methodologies have been proposed, such as like using probabilistic
comparisons based on randomly selected tests satisfying different criteria [25].

2.1.1. Specification based Testing
Weyuker et al. [24] propose several strategies about how to automatically generate test
data for a given boolean specification formula. In order to test an implementation of a
given boolean formula F with n distinct variables, a number of test cases have to be
picked from n-dimensional Boolean Space. Exhaustive testing is expensive, because a
formula of n variables requires exponential number - 2n distinct test cases.

In [24], Weyuker et al. define different categories of test points, the most general being
true points (points which cause the formula to evaluate to 1), and false points (points
which cause the formula to evaluate to 0). True points are furthermore divided on unique
true points for particular term pi of the formula given in disjunctive normal form (points
which make the particular term true and consequently the whole formula true, however
they do not make any other terms true), and overlapping true points (points which are true
points for more then one term). The false points are divided on near false points (points
which are false for given formula, however they are true points for the same formula with
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one complemented variable in one of the terms – representing incorrect or erroneous
implementation) and remaining false points.

The basic strategy is conceived to test for particular type of fault called Variable
Negation Fault (one of the variables in the implementation has been mistakenly
complemented) and is motivated by hardware testing approaches. It selects one true test
point for each term of the formula, and selects one near false point for each possibly
complemented variable in each term of the formula. Refining this basic strategy,
Weyuker et al. propose different algorithms for automatic generation of test points for
boolean formula specifications. The algorithms differ only in the number of points which
are selected from the previously described categories.

2.1.2. Relation to Dissertation Research
The proposed algorithms are directly applicable to automated generation of test cases
from SCR specifications as well as extending the coverage measures defined in this
dissertation. The events and conditions in the SCR model can be represented as boolean
formulas and used as input to the proposed algorithms. The test points generated by the
algorithms represent particular assignment to the variables involved and used by a model
checker to generate test cases for specific transition and the corresponding test points or
monitored by the coverage-tracking tool.

Formal approaches to testing have been the focus of recent research. Specification based
testing can be used for test generation early in the software lifecycle, before any code is
written. Model checking has been used for automated test generation, leveraging the
success of model checkers in generating counter examples [4][5]. The advantage of this
methodology when compared with random testing has been questioned in a recent study
[42]. However, other studies reached the opposite results [45], concluding that more
research in this area is required.
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2.2. Model Checking
Temporal model checking [22] is a method for automatically deciding if a finite state
program satisfies given temporal property. There are two main methods of model
checking: state based (ex. the model checker SPIN), using depth-first search algorithm to
explore the state space; or symbolic based, using binary decision diagrams (BDD [55])
and breath-first search algorithm to explore the state space (ex. the model checker SMV).
An additional model checking method proposed recently is Bounded Model Checking
that uses SAT solvers in order to perform model checking with limited depth.
A model checking algorithm for the propositional branching logic CTL was presented at
the 1983 POPL conference [21]. The algorithm was linear both in the size of the model
determined by the program and in the length of the given temporal property. In the paper,
it was used to verify a simple version of the alternating bit protocol with 20 states. Since
then, the size of the programs that can be verified by this means has increased
dramatically. By developing special programming languages for describing transition
systems, it became possible to check examples with several thousand sates. This was
sufficient to find subtle errors in a number of nontrivial, although relatively small,
protocols and circuit designs [38].
Use of binary decision diagrams [55] led to an even greater increase in size. Representing
transition relations implicitly using BDDs made it possible to verify examples that would
have required 1020 states with the original version of the algorithm [33]. Refinements of
the BDD-based techniques [32] have pushed the state count up to over 10100 states. The
size of the BDD can be exponential on the length of the formula it represents and is
highly dependent on the ordering of the variables. Finding the optimal ordering is NP
complete. In practice, symbolic model checking usually gives better results than state
based model checking, allowing larger models to be verified.
With recent advances in abstractions [23] the limit has been pushed even further. The
authors of [23] report the verification of a pipelined ALU circuit with 64 registers, each
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64 bits wide, having more than 101300 reachable states. Another technique that has been
proposed to combat the state explosion problem, which plagues model checking, is the
compositional verification approach with assume-guarantee reasoning [20][68][69].
Despite the large number of research results in composition, it is rarely adopted in
practical software development. Probably the main reasons are the hardness of satisfying
the assumptions and that user ingenuity might be required to come up with the
decomposition and the needed assumptions.

2.2.1. Bounded Model Checking
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) was first proposed by Biere et al. in 1999 [1]. The
basic idea is to search for a counterexample in executions whose length is bounded by
some integer k. If no faults are found then k is increased until a fault is found, we are out
of resources, or we have reached some pre-determined upper limit [2].
The BMC problem can be efficiently reduced to a propositional satisfiability problem and
can be solved by SAT methods rather than BDDs. Modern SAT solvers can handle
propositional satisfiability problems with hundreds of thousands of variables or more.
Unfortunately, BMC has the disadvantage of not being complete, in most cases, and
consequently not being able to prove absence of errors.
Experiments have shown [2] that if k is small enough, e.g. not more than 60 to 80 steps,
BMC outperforms BDD based techniques.

2.2.2. Relation to Dissertation Research
Our research addresses the issue of abstraction, but unlike the methods presented in [23],
we advocate component-based abstraction, which utilizes the underlying modularity of
specifications. We also address the issue of decomposing the specification into selfcontained components by minimizing the information exchange between the components
(e.g. joint variables or dependencies) and thus facilitating the ease of compositional
validation.
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A recent research addresses these problems by automatically generated invariants which
are used for compositional verification [59][60]. Jeffords and Heitmeyer in [59] present
the underlying theory for compositional verification of SCR specifications together with
a strategy for verification that uses the generated invariants about a single variable and
performs abstraction by removing this variable from the specification. Our approach
extends this work by considering components of the specification (i.e. sets of variables)
which have low coupling in terms of information exchange with the rest of the
specification.
We use model checking techniques for verification of the components and present testing
approaches applicable in the case when model checking is infeasible. The SCR toolset
already has a module for exporting SCR specification in the Promela language which is
used by model checker SPIN, as well as a module for exporting models in the language
used by the SMV symbolic model checker.

2.3. Theorem Proving
Since the early work of Hoare, theorem proving has shown great promise for software
verification. It does not suffer from the state explosion problem and even infinite state
systems can be verified. However, the main problem with the theorem proving approach
is its difficulty of application in practice. Unlike model checking, which is fully
automated and represents a “pushbutton technique”, theorem proving requires advanced
mathematical skills and some user ingenuity in order to guide the theorem proving
process.
Hoare’s initial work has been later extended by Amir Pnueli and Zohar Manna [73] for
the purposes of verification of concurrent and reactive systems. They introduced temporal
logic in the computer science arena, and showed how it can be used for reasoning about
programs. Interesting work on using temporal logic for compositional specification and
verification of concurrent systems can be found in Lamport and Abadi's research papers
[36][41].
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Abadi and Lamport argue that the most natural way of representing composition of
systems is by using conjunction of their specifications. They developed proof rules for
reasoning about the correctness of such systems presented in the formalisms of Temporal
Logic of Actions (TLA). This idea of representing the system specification as a
conjunction of subsystems is central in the theory underlying the compositional
verification of SCR requirements specifications, one of the goals of our research.
One of the most popular mechanized theorem proving systems is the PVS specification
and verification system [75]. PVS consists of a specification language, a number of
predefined theories, and a theorem prover. The PVS theorem prover provides a collection
of powerful primitive inference procedures that are applied interactively under user
guidance within a calculus framework. The primitive inferences include propositional
and quantifier rules, induction, rewriting, and decision procedures for linear arithmetic.
Current research in the application of theorem proving to software verification is focused
on taming the complexity and making it as automated as possible [46].

2.3.1. Relation to Dissertation Research
Abadi and Lamport [41] ideas on representing composition of systems by using
conjunction of their specifications is central in the underlying theory we present on
compositional verification of SCR requirements specifications. Similar to their work, we
are also limiting our interest to safety properties, and advocate specifying SCR properties
that are associated with components.
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Chapter 3. Background and a Motivating Example

Chapter 3
Background and a Motivating Example

In this chapter, we present the research background and tools on which the dissertation
relies more heavily, i.e. the SCR requirements methodology and the underlying
reachability theory from which the compositional deduction rules arise. We also
introduce the min-cut problem by giving a formal problem statement and present some of
the current algorithms for its solution. To illustrate the key concepts of this dissertation
we present a small SCR requirement specification of a nuclear reactor safety injection
system, which was introduced in [50] and is available as an example with the SCR
toolset.

3.1. Software Cost Reduction (SCR) Method
In SCR we represent the environmental quantities as monitored and controlled variables.
The environment non-deterministically produces a sequence of input events, where an
input event represents a change in some monitored quantity. The system, represented as a
finite state machine, begins execution in an initial state. It responds to each input event by
changing the state and, possibly, by producing one or more output events. Output events
are changes in controlled variables. An assumption of the model is that at each state
transition exactly one monitored variable changes its value, often referred to as “one
input” assumption. To concisely capture the system behavior, SCR specifications may
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include two types of internal auxiliary variables: terms, and mode classes. Mode classes
and terms often capture historical information.
In the SCR operational model, system Σ is defined as a finite state machine
Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ), where V = { r1, r2, …, rn } is the set of state variables, S is the set of
states, Θ : S → boolean is the initial state predicate, and ρ : S × S → boolean is the next
state predicate representing the transition relation. A state s in S is a function that maps
each variable x ∈ V to a value x(s) from its set of legal values. Usually, the evolution of
the system described by the transition relation ρ is deterministic, i.e., it can be
represented as a function that maps a given state and an input event to only one possible
next state. To construct the next state predicate ρ, SCR uses the composition of smaller
functions described in a tabular notation, thus improving the readability and
understandability of the specification. There are three kinds of tables in SCR
requirements specifications, event tables, condition tables, and mode tables. These tables
describe the values of each dependent variable, that is, each controlled variable, mode
class, or term.
In SCR, a state is a function that maps each variable in the specification to a value, a
condition is a predicate defined on a system state, and an event is a predicate defined on a
pair of adjacent system states implying that the value of at least one state variable has
changed. When a variable changes value, we say that an event “occurs". The following
notation is used to denote an event in which some condition becomes true:
= ¬c ∧ c'
@T( c ) def

where c is a condition evaluated in the current state, and the primed condition is
evaluated in the next state. Informally the notation @T(c) can be read as “at true c,”
meaning that we are interested in the event when the logical value of the predicate c
changes from false in the current state to true in the next state. Similarly an opposing
event is denoted with @F(c) - “at false c”, meaning that we are interested in the event
when the logic value of the predicate c changes from true to false.
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= @ T( ¬ c ) = c ∧ ¬ c'
@F( c ) def

We can also have conditioned events, denoting that we are interested in the event only
when some predicate already holds. The expression “@T(c) WHEN d” represents a
conditioned event, which is defined by:
@T( c ) WHEN d

def
=

¬c ∧ c' ∧ d

where the unprimed conditions c and d are evaluated in the current state and the primed
condition c is evaluated in the next state.
The keyword NEVER denotes a special event that is always false. We use the NEVER
event in the SCR tables to denote transitions which should never occur during the
operation of the system. In addition, there is a special condition keyword INMODE,
which is shorthand for specifying that the value of the mode variable is equal to the mode
specified in the first column of the row. Similarly, @T(INMODE) denotes the event
when the mode variable becomes equal to the mode specified in the first column of the
row. We give an example of an SCR requirements specification using all these constructs
and keywords in the next section.
A condition table (Table 1) specifies that the value of the variable Xi is vk if the boolean
condition cj,k holds in mode mj.

Modes
m1
...
mn
Xi =

Table 1: Condition Table format.
Conditions
c1,1
c1,2
...
...
...
...
cn,1
cn,2
...
v1
v2
...

c1,m
...
cn,m
vm

An event table (Table 2) specifies that the variable Yi takes value vk when event ej,k
happens in mode mj .
Modes
m1
...
mn
Yi =

e1,1
...
en,1
v1

Table 2: Event Table format.
Events
e1,2
...
en,2
v2

...
...
...
...

e1,m
...
en,m
vm
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Mode tables (Table 3) are a variant of event tables and specify the behavior of a mode
class: if mode has value mi and an event ek happens, then mode becomes mj.

Old Mode
m1
...
mn

Table 3: Mode Table format.
Event
ei
...
ej

New Mode
mi
...
mk

The condition and event tables can have another variant called modeless condition or
event tables. These are used in the case when the behavior of a specific variable is not
tightly connected to some mode variable, so they have a single row and the mode
precondition is considered to be always satisfied.
The SCR model requires the entries in each table to satisfy consistency and completeness
properties. The completeness property, in the sense of SCR, is defined as complete
definition of the tables, i.e. there cannot be cells which are empty or missing, and each
enumerated value must be used as a possible assignment in the corresponding variable
specification table. The consistency property ensures that the conditions or events used in
specifying the variable are disjoint, i.e. there cannot be non-deterministic assignments of
two or more values to a single variable at any point in time. These properties are
automatically checked by the SCR toolset and guarantee that all of the tables describe
total functions [10]. We must note that the defined completeness and consistency
properties do not guarantee the correctness of the developed specification; they just
provide assurance in the structural accuracy.

3.2. Motivating Example – Safety Injection System
To illustrate the key SCR constructs and the problems we are facing when performing
verification we presents a simple specification of a nuclear safety system. The Safety
Injection System (SIS) SCR specification describes the safety system of a water coolant
system in a nuclear reactor [50]. Based on the pressure sensor readings the system
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decides whether a safety injection of water is needed in the reactor cooling system. The
sensor system uses triple modular redundancy to deal with possible sensor failures and
erroneous readings. Depending on the pressure monitored by three sensors and using
majority voting, the system performs injection if the pressure is too low. Figure 2
presents a visual interface used for simulation and testing of the SIS specification.

Figure 2: Visual Interface of the SIS specification.

3.2.1. SCR tables of the SIS specification
The SIS specification is a small specification with 5 monitored variables, 1 controlled
variable, 3 term variables, and 2 mode variables. The SCR specification first defines the
variables by giving their types and domains. The pressure sensors PG, PR and PB are
monitored variables defined as integers having the range between [0, 2000] psi. The other
two monitored variables are RESET and BLOCK representing switches on the control
table with two possible values {ON, OFF}.
The MajorityPermit term variable is a boolean variable and its specification is given by
the condition Table 4. From Table 4 we see that MajorityPermit is set to TRUE when any
two pressure sensors are less than the value of the permit constant, which is defined as
1000 psi in the specification document. When we do not have two sensors which are less
than permit the MajorityPermit variable is set to FALSE.
Table 4: MajorityPermit Condition Function.
Conditions
((PG < permit) AND (PR < permit)) NOT (((PG < permit) AND (PR < permit))
OR ((PR < permit) AND (PB < permit)) OR ((PR < permit) AND (PB < permit))
OR ((PG < permit) AND (PB < permit)) OR ((PG < permit) AND (PB < permit)))
MajorityPermit =
TRUE
FALSE
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The MajorityLow term variable (Table 5) is specified in an analogous way as the
MajorityPermit variable. The only difference is that the low constant is now used, which is

defined as 900 psi in the specification document. Table 4 and Table 5 are examples of
modeless condition tables, since their definition does not involve a mode variable.

MajorityLow =

Table 5: MajorityLow Condition Function.
Conditions
((PG < low) AND (PR < low)) NOT (((PG < low) AND (PR < low))
OR ((PR < low) AND (PB < low)) OR ((PR < low) AND (PB < low))
OR ((PG < low) AND (PB < low)) OR ((PG < low) AND (PB < low)))
TRUE
FALSE

Table 6: PermitStatus Mode Transition Function.
Source Mode(s)
Events
Destination Mode
BelowPermissive
@F(MajorityPermit)
AbovePermissive
AbovePermissive
@T(MajorityPermit)
BelowPermissive

Table 6 presents the mode table for the PermitStatus mode variable. The first row of the
table specifies that if the previous value of the PermitStatus is BelowPermissive and the
boolean variable MajorityPermit becomes false then PermitStatus is assigned
AbovePermissive as the new value. Similarly, the second row states that if the previous

value was AbovePermissive and MajorityPermit becomes true, the next value of
PermitStatus will be BelowPermissive. So, the assignment of a new value to a mode

variable depends on its previous value, and an event causing the transition.
Table 7: M_Pressure Mode Transition Function.
Source Mode(s)
Events
Destination Mode
Low
@F(MajorityLow)
Normal
Low
@F(MajorityPermit)
VoterFailure
Normal
@T(MajorityLow) WHEN MajorityPermit
Low
Normal
@T(MajorityLow) WHEN (NOT MajorityPermit)
VoterFailure
VoterFailure
@T(MajorityPermit)
Low
VoterFailure
@F(MajorityLow)
Normal
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The mode variable M_Pressure is defined by the function described in Table 7. The table
specifies the following transitions for the M_Pressure variable: 1) in case the current
mode is Low and the MajorityLow variable becomes false, then the new mode for
M_Pressure will be Normal; 2) in case the current mode is Low and the MajorityPermit

variable becomes false, then the new mode for M_Pressure will be VoterFailure; 3) if the
mode is Normal and MajorityLow becomes true when MajorityPermit is true, then the next
value for the M_Pressure will be Low; 4) if the current mode is Normal and the
MajorityLow variable becomes true when MajorityPermit is not true, then the new mode

will be VoterFailure; 5) if the current mode is VoterFailure and the MajorityPermit
variable becomes true then the new mode for M_Pressure will be low; and 6) if the
current mode is VoterFailure and the MajorityLow variable becomes false, then the new
mode will be Normal.
Table 8: OVERRIDDEN Event Function.
Modes for PermitStatus
Events
AbovePermissive
Never
BelowPermissive
@T(Block = ON) WHEN (Reset = OFF)
BelowPermissive
Never
OVERRIDDEN' =
TRUE

@T(Inmode)
@T(Reset = ON)
@T(Inmode)
FALSE

The OVERRIDEN term variable is specified by the regular SCR event table given in
Table 8. Depending on the current value of the PermitStatus mode variable, the new
value of OVERRIDEN is assigned to TRUE or FALSE. In essence, OVERRIDEN becomes
TRUE only if PermitStatus is BelowPermissive and the monitored variable Block

becomes equal to ON when the Reset variable is equal to OFF. Whenever PermitStatus
becomes equal to AbovePermissive or BelowPermisive, or in the event that the Reset
variable becomes equal to ON when the PermitStatus is BelowPermissive, the
OVERRIDEN variable becomes equal to FALSE.
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Table 9: Safety_Injection Condition Function.
Modes for M_Pressure
Conditions
Normal
FALSE
TRUE
Low
NOT OVERRIDDEN
OVERRIDDEN
VoterFailure
TRUE
FALSE
Safety_Injection =
ON
OFF

The controlled variable Safety_Injection (Table 9) determines whether a safety injection
is performed or not depending on the current value of the M_Pressure mode variable.
When M_Pressure is Normal, the value of the Safety_Injection variable is OFF; when the
M_Pressure is Low and the OVERRIDEN variable is FALSE, the Safety_Injection is ON,

otherwise in the same mode when the OVERRIDEN variable is TRUE the
Safety_Injection is OFF; finally if the mode of M_Pressure is VoterFailure then
Safety_Injection is ON.

Figure 3: Dependency Graph of the Safety Injection SCR specification.

Given the SCR specification in tabular notation, we can observe that there are
dependencies between the variables (Figure 3). In other words, the value of a particular
variable depends on values of some other variables. This dependency chain starts with the
monitored variables, used by the system to observe changes in the environment, and ends
with controlled variables, which are produced by the system in order to affect the
environment. The SCR toolset [9] includes dependency graph browser, which is used for
navigation through or manual slicing of the specification under development.
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3.2.2. Problems in the Verification
Once the operational part of the SIS is specified, we proceed with verification of the
stated properties that the specification must satisfy. We are focusing on safety properties,
which can be either state or transition properties.
For example, we would like to prove that the following property holds:
Override Works: Reset = ON => not OVERRIDDEN.
This property states that the system cannot be stuck in overridden mode, i.e., if the
monitored variable Reset is ON, then Overriden should be false.

pan: out of memory
(Spin Version 4.2.5 -- 2 April 2005)
Warning: Search not completed
Full statespace search for:
never claim

- (not selected)

assertion violations +
cycle checks

- (disabled by -DSAFETY)

invalid end states

+

State-vector 40 byte, depth reached 499999, errors: 0
1.1879e+07 states, stored
2.2326e+06 states, matched
1.41116e+07 transitions (= stored+matched)
0 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 1.92053e+06 (resolved)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes):
522.675

equivalent memory usage for states (stored*(State-vector + overhead))

475.349

actual memory usage for states (compression: 90.95%)

State-vector as stored = 36 byte + 4 byte overhead
33.554

memory used for hash table (-w23)

14.000

memory used for DFS stack (-m500000)

27.836

other (proc and chan stacks)

0.082

memory lost to fragmentation

536.822

total actual memory usage

Figure 4: Execution of the SPIN on the complete model.
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We first tried to run the model checker SPIN on the whole model. As expected, this was
unsuccessful because we have run out of memory (see Figure 4). Since PG, PB, PR are
integer variables with a big range we observed state space explosion when using explicit
model checkers like SPIN. The application of the symbolic model checking tool SMV
was successful and proved the property in 16 seconds. We also tried to apply the
inductive theorem proving tool SALSA, however, it was unsuccessful in proving the
property because of the incompleteness of the tool.

3.2.3. Proposed Approach

We explore how to utilize the modular structure of the SIS specification in order to
enable more efficient verification of the stated properties. For example, the SIS
specification can be decomposed into two parts: the triple modular redundancy sensor
module (lower left corner of Figure 5), and the control module (upper part in Figure 5).
The properties that involve variables within a single component can be soundly verified
by abstracting the rest of the system. The properties that involve variables within several
components can be verified either by combining the affected components or by using
compositional proof rules.

Figure 5: Decomposition of the SIS specification.
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In order to verify the stated Override Works property, we observe that we can focus on
the identified control module. Application of the SPIN model checker verifies the
property in 0.062 seconds avoiding the state explosion problem. SMV also verifies the
property in 0.016 seconds, which is 1000 times faster than performing verification on the
complete system.
We just demonstrated a single property, which is not enough to establish the correctness
of the whole system (i.e. our checklist representing required properties is far from
complete). However, we see that being able to verify properties focusing just on
components of the specification is beneficial from performance standpoint. We must note
that in general this is not as easy as illustrated in the given example. The underlying
assumptions for this methodology to work are that the original specification is modular in
nature and that the properties have been stated on component boundaries, or they involve
only few components. Emergent system properties should be presented as conjunction of
component properties to ease their compositional verification. We present a
decomposition methodology that identifies the components of a given SCR specification
and present a strategy for efficient verification of decomposable specifications.

3.3. Theoretical Basis for the Verification of Decomposable
Models
In this section, we review the theoretical foundation for the compositional verification of
SCR requirements specifications based on [59]. As mentioned previously, the SCR model
of a given system Σ can be viewed as a finite state machine, represented by the quadruple
Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ) where:


V is a set of variables. It contains the monitored, controlled, and internal (term and
mode class) variables of the system;



S is the set of system states. Each state s ∈ S maps each variable x ∈ V to a value
in its set of legal values. The value of a variable x in state s is denoted by x(s);



Θ : S → boolean is a one-state predicate defining the set of initial states;
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ρ : S × S → boolean is a two-state predicate defining the transitions of Σ. A state s
may transition to a sate s’ if ρ(s, s’) is true.

The properties the system must satisfy, called system invariants, are represented by the
first order logical formulae (predicates), defined on a single state, or a transition. The
truth value of a single state predicate φ(s) is calculated by replacing the variables it
involves with the values from s. Two-state predicate ϕ(s, s’) is evaluated with values
from s replacing unprimed variables and values from s’ replacing primed variables. The
following are standard definitions for reachability and invariants (e.g. see [54]).
Definition 1: Given a state machine Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ), a state s ∈ S is reachable, denoted
ReachableΣ(s), if and only if it is one of the initial states or if there exists another
reachable state s1 from which we can make a transition to the state s.
ReachableΣ(s) ⇔ Θ(s) ∨ ∃ s1 ∈ S : ReachableΣ(s1) ∧ ρ(s1, s)
Often we need to use induction on the number of steps, so the following definition is
beneficial. A state s ∈ S reachable in n steps denoted Reachable nΣ(s) is defined by:

Θ( s ), n = 0
Reachable n Σ ( s ) ⇔ 
n −1
 ∃ s1 ∈ S : Reachable Σ ( s1 ) ∧ ρ ( s1 , s ), n > 0
■
Definition 2: Given a state machine Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ), a one-state predicate φ(s) is a state

invariant of Σ if and only if it holds for all reachable states.

φ ∈ Inv(Σ) ⇔ ∀ s ∈ S : ReachableΣ(s) ⇒ φ(s)
■
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Definition 3: A two-state predicate ϕ (s, s’) is a transition invariant of Σ if and only if it

holds for all pairs of adjacent reachable states.

ϕ ∈ Inv(Σ) ⇔ ∀ s, s’ ∈ S : (ReachableΣ(s) ∧ ρ(s, s’)) ⇒ ϕ (s, s’)
■

The following theorems (Theorem 1 and 2) are also given in [54].
Theorem 1: Let Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ), then φ(s) is a state invariant of Σ if the following holds:

(∀ s ∈ S : Θ(s) ⇒ φ(s)) ∧ (∀ s, s’ ∈ S : φ(s) ∧ ρ(s, s’) ⇒ φ(s’)).
The proof follows from definitions 1 and 2, by using induction on the number of steps.
Basically we ensure that the property φ(s) holds for the initial states, and then show that if
it holds in the current state, it must also hold in the next state defined by the transition
relation, thus covering all reachable states as required by definition 2. However, it covers
more than just the reachable states, thus causing incompleteness. Some unreachable states
can cause the right side of the premise to fail and dispute the validity of some probable
invariant.
■

This theorem gives us the initial deductive rule for proving single state invariants (Eq. 1).
In this shorter notation φ is a single state property and φ’ denotes the same property
evaluated in the next state.
Θ ⇒ φ , (φ ∧ ρ ) ⇒ φ ′
(Eq. 1)
φ ∈ Inv(Σ )
We can strengthen the rule by using additional previously proven invariants. This allows
us to reduce the incompleteness in the previous rule by using invariants that restrict the
unreachable states causing it to fail. The deduction rules (Eq. 2) are obtained, where α
represents a single state invariant and β represents a transition invariant for the system Σ.

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 3: Background and a Motivating Example

31

α ∈ Inv(Σ ), (α ∧ Θ ) ⇒ φ , (φ ∧ α ∧ α ′ ∧ ρ ) ⇒ φ ′
;
φ ∈ Inv(Σ )
and

β ∈ Inv(Σ ), Θ ⇒ φ , (φ ∧ β ∧ ρ ) ⇒ φ ′
(Eq. 2)
φ ∈ Inv(Σ )

Theorem 2: Let Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ), then ϕ(s, s’) is a transition invariant of Σ if the

following holds: ∀ s, s’ ∈ S : ρ(s, s’) ⇒ ϕ(s, s’).
The proof follows from definition 3 by removing the requirement that the state s should
be reachable. This introduces incompleteness, meaning that there might be invariants that
we might not be able to prove by this theorem.
■

Like in the previous case, this theorem gives us the initial deduction rule (Eq. 3) for
proving transition invariants.

ρ ⇒ϕ

ϕ ∈ Inv(Σ )

(Eq. 3)

It also can be strengthened by using auxiliary state or transition invariants as presented in
(Eq. 4).

α ∈ Inv(Σ ), (α ∧ α ′ ∧ ρ ) ⇒ ϕ
β ∈ Inv(Σ ), (β ∧ ρ ) ⇒ ϕ
; and
(Eq. 4)
ϕ ∈ Inv(Σ )
ϕ ∈ Inv(Σ )
The problem in using these rules for verification of system properties is that they rely on
the specification of entire system Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ). We would like to apply our
decomposition methodology to divide the system into smaller subsystems Σ1, Σ2, …, Σn,
and perform the verification task on these components instead on the complete system.
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3.3.1. Compositional Verification Rules
Abadi and Lamport [41] argue that most natural way of representing composition of
systems is by using conjunction of their specifications. This idea of representing the
system specification as conjunction of subsystems is central in the underlying theory we
present on compositional verification of SCR requirements specifications. Similar to their
work, we are also limiting our interest to safety properties, and advocate specifying SCR
properties that are associated with components.
Without the loss of generality, we consider how to decompose a given system
Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ) into two subsystems Σ1 and Σ2 allowing us to perform verification on the
components. We use the same definition of parallel composition of state machines as
given by Jeffords and Heitmeyer in [59].
Definition 4: Given two state machines Σ1 = (V, S, Θ1, ρ1) and Σ2 = (V, S, Θ2, ρ2), with

the same set of variables and the same allowed values for each of the variables, their
parallel composition Σ1||Σ2 is defined as conjunction, i.e., Σ1||Σ2 = (V, S, Θ1∧Θ2, ρ1∧ρ2).
■

Theorem 3: All reachable states within n steps of Σ1||Σ2 are those that are reachable in

both Σ1 and Σ2 within n steps.
ReachablenΣ1||Σ2(s) ⇔ ReachablenΣ1(s) ∧ ReachablenΣ2(s)
The proof follows from definitions 1 and 4 using induction on the number of steps
needed to reach the state. Since the set of all reachable states is obtained when we let the
number of steps to go to infinity
{s : s ∈ S ∧ ReachableΣ(s)} = {s : s ∈ S ∧ Reachablen→∞Σ(s)}
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we conclude that all reachable states of Σ1||Σ2 are those that are reachable in both Σ1 and
Σ 2.
■
Corollary 1: Invariants of each of the subsystems are also invariants of the composition,

i.e., Inv(Σi) ⊆ Inv(Σ1||Σ2) for i = 1, 2. From Theorem 3 it follows that each component
contains all reachable states of the composition and possibly some more. Although this
seams contradictory for verification purposes, we will show in Chapter 4 that focusing
the verification on properties that are stated on components boundaries and performing
abstractions will reduce the state spaces of the derived components.
■

Since the components may have additional reachable states, possibly invalidating
properties that might hold true, we can use already proven invariants from the other
components to strengthen the deduction rules. The rules (Eq. 5) can be used for this
purpose, where α represents a single state invariant and β represents a transition invariant
for the subsystem Σ1.

α ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), (α ∧ Θ 2 ) ⇒ φ , (φ ∧ α ∧ α ′ ∧ ρ 2 ) ⇒ φ ′
;
φ ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )
and

β ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), Θ 2 ⇒ φ , (φ ∧ β ∧ ρ 2 ) ⇒ φ ′
(Eq. 5)
φ ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )

A similar sound compositional rule for proving a two-state property ϕ is invariant is
given in (Eq. 6):

α ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), (α ∧ α ′ ∧ ρ 2 ) ⇒ ϕ
β ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), (β ∧ ρ 2 ) ⇒ ϕ
; and
(Eq. 6)
ϕ ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )
ϕ ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )
Thus, the strategy for verification would be to decompose a given system into
components which if composed using parallel composition result in the system itself.
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Then we prove invariants that hold for the components by using the deduction rules.
From the Corollary 1 it follows that the proven invariants also hold for the complete
system. Jeffords and Heitmeyer in [59] present a strategy for verification that performs
abstraction by removing a single variable from the specification and uses the
automatically generated invariants [60] for the abstracted variable to strengthen the
deduction rules. Our approach extends this strategy by considering components of the
specification (i.e. sets of variables) which have low coupling and information exchange
with the rest of the specification. Instead of automatically generating invariants for the
abstracted components, our approach is to specify properties on component level and
later try to prove that they are invariants and use them in the certification process of the
system as a whole.
Since each component usually assumes some properties about the environment for its
correct operation, the rules (Eq. 5) and (Eq. 6) can be considered as assume-guarantee
rules. We use them to prove and guarantee some properties of the component and
consequently the system based on assumptions about the environment. These
assumptions are either properties stating the correctness of components that the specific
component interacts with, or assumptions about the monitored variables.

3.3.2. Circular Assume-Guarantee Rules
McMillan [34] argues that often in practical applications there is a need for a circular
assume-guarantee rule. This happens when some properties φ1 and φ2, which we want to
prove, require that the proof of φ1 for subsystem Σ1 depends on φ2 and that the proof of φ2
for subsystem Σ2 depends on φ1. During our research, we have not witnessed a case
where such a rule was needed or applicable on SCR requirements we worked with. This
is probably due to our restriction to state and transition safety properties, which are most
commonly used in SCR specifications. In the case when more complex temporal
properties are considered, we envision that this rule comes into play. Its exposition is
useful since, as demonstrated by Jeffords and Heitmeyer [59], it leads to compositional
rules similar to the ones demonstrated in the previous section that are geared towards
model checking.
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McMillan’s rule for circular compositional reasoning is given by (Eq. 7). The basic idea
is to use induction and show that if assuming φ2 holds during the evolution of the system
Σ1 from step 0 to n – 1, then φ1 also holds from 0 up to step n. If the opposite is
demonstrated for the system Σ2, proving that φ2 holds from 0 up to step n assuming that

φ1 holds from 0 to n – 1, then by induction we conclude that both properties hold for the
system. In general, McMillan’s rule is used for proving the invariance of conjunction of
two Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) properties φ1 ∧ φ2, but in our case we are only
interested in the defined state and transition properties.
Σ1 |= φ 2 up to n − 1 ⇒ φ1 up to n
Σ 2 |= φ1 up to n − 1 ⇒ φ 2 up to n
(Eq. 7)
φ1 ∧ φ 2 ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )
For the special case when φ1 and φ2 are state properties, the McMillan rule can be
simplified using the following observation. The fact that one-state property φ holds up
through step n – 1 can be soundly replaced by the conjunction of the assumed one-state
property with both Θ and ρ in Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ), producing a new system
Π = (V, S, φ ∧ Θ, φ ∧ ρ). This simplification with the additional requirement that φ1 and

φ2 hold for the initial states of Σ1||Σ2 produces the following circular assume-guarantee
rule:
Θ1 ∧ Θ 2 ⇒ φ1 ∧ φ 2 , φ1 ∈ Inv(V , S , φ 2 ∧ Θ1 , φ 2 ∧ ρ1 ), φ 2 ∈ Inv(V , S , φ1 ∧ Θ 2 , φ1 ∧ ρ 2 )
.(Eq.8)
φ1 ∧ φ 2 ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )
This proof rule also can be strengthened by adding auxiliary state invariants, α ∈ Inv(Σ1)
and β ∈ Inv(Σ2) to improve the completeness of the rule:

α ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), β ∈ Inv(Σ 2 ), Θ1 ∧ Θ 2 ⇒ φ1 ∧ φ 2 ,
φ1 ∈ Inv(V , S , α ∧ β ∧ φ 2 ∧ Θ1 , α ∧ β ∧ α ′ ∧ β ′ ∧ φ 2 ∧ ρ1 ),
φ 2 ∈ Inv(V , S , α ∧ β ∧ φ1 ∧ Θ 2 , α ∧ β ∧ α ′ ∧ β ′ ∧ φ1 ∧ ρ 2 )
. (Eq. 9)
φ1 ∧ φ 2 ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 3: Background and a Motivating Example

36

For the special case when β = TRUE and φ1 = TRUE, by renaming φ2 to φ we obtain rule
(Eq. 10) which similar to (Eq. 5). The rule (Eq. 10) is more applicable to model checking
or any other method of establishing invariants, instead of using proofs of implications
required by rule (Eq. 5).

α ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), Θ1 ∧ Θ 2 ⇒ φ , φ ∈ Inv(V , S , α ∧ Θ 2 , α ∧ α ′ ∧ ρ 2 )
(Eq. 10)
φ ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )
Applying rule (Eq. 1) we arrive at the exact version of rule (Eq. 5), but now starting from
the McMillan’s assume guarantee rule:

α ∈ Inv(Σ1 ), (α ∧ Θ 2 ) ⇒ φ , (φ ∧ α ∧ α ′ ∧ ρ 2 ) ⇒ φ ′
. (Eq. 11)
φ ∈ Inv(Σ1 || Σ 2 )

3.4. The Min-Cut problem

We propose to use min-cut graph algorithms to determine the points of minimal coupling
in a given SCR specification thus automating the component identification and
abstraction.
The minimum cut problem is defined as follows:
Given an undirected graph G(E,V) with a set of vertices |V| = n and a set of corresponding
edges |E| = m, we are interested in partitioning the vertices in two sets, V1 and V2, such
that the sum of the weights of the edges with end-points in the different sets is minimal.
■

A closely related problem to the general minimum cut is finding the minimum capacity
cut between two given vertices, source - s and a sink - t, called the minimum s-t cut
problem. Thanks to the maximum flow – minimum cut theorem, maximum flow
algorithms can be used to identify the minimum s-t cut in polynomial time.
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The maximum flow – minimum cut theorem [35][64] states:

The maximal flow between two vertices vi and vj in a graph G is exactly the weight of the
smallest set of edges to disconnect G with vi and vj in different components.
■

Given an undirected graph G(E,V) with a set of vertices |V| = n and a set of corresponding
edges |E| = m, the classical algorithms of Ford and Fulkerson [35] and Edmonds and Karp
[29], solve the maximum flow in O(n3) time. For extensive review on the minimum cut
algorithms and their performance information, the reader is referred to [8]. We used the
author’s implementations, which are freely available [76], to conduct the research
presented in this dissertation. The fastest current algorithms for the minimum s-t cut
problem use flow techniques, in particular, the push-relabel method and run in ω (nm)
time. For the general minimum cut problem - the classical Gomory-Hu algorithm solves
the minimum cut problem using (n – 1) minimum s-t cut computations.
Recent advances resulted in faster algorithms for the minimum cut problem. Hao and
Orlin developed an algorithm based on the push-relabel method, which shows how to
perform all (n – 1) minimum s-t cuts in time asymptotically equal to that needed to
perform one s-t minimum cut computation. This algorithm runs in O(nmlog(n2/m)) time.
Several other algorithms for the general min cut problem have been proposed that have
better bounds than the known algorithms for the minimum s–t cut problem. The
algorithm of Nagamochi and Ibaraki runs in O(n(m + nlogn)) time. The algorithm of
Karger and Stein runs in O(n2log3n) expected time. Two closely related algorithms of
Karger run in O(mlog3n) and O(n2logn) expected time.
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Chapter 4. Component-based Verification

Chapter 4
Component-based Verification

Complex systems typically contain subsystems, which include different and possibly
disjoint sets of monitored variables. For example, in an avionic system we have a
navigation subsystem that depends on the altitude, speed, and direction; another lifesupport subsystem would deal with the cabin pressure and temperature. Several
specification slicing techniques [6][12] have been proposed in order to tame a system’s
complexity and avoid state space explosion in formal verification. However, most of
them are done ad hoc and require a user’s experience in order to be applied successfully.
Validation and verification of such complex specifications can be extremely timeconsuming, especially if we are not familiar with the system being specified.
Since the early days of the SCR Method, Parnas et al. [15] have argued that complex
systems must be built by utilizing a modular structure. They demonstrate how the
information hiding and abstraction principles are to be followed in the design of the
Onboard Flight Program (OFP) for the A-7E aircraft by writing a hierarchical module
guide document. The guide is intended to achieve the following goals:
a) A software engineer should be able to understand the responsibility of a module
without understanding the module’s internal design;
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b) A reader with a well-defined concern should easily be able to identify the relevant
modules without studying irrelevant modules;
c) The number of branches at each non-terminal module in the hierarchy graph should
be small enough so that the designers can prepare convincing arguments
demonstrating that the sub-modules have no overlapping responsibilities and that the
module covers all of the intended responsibilities.
These principles, since their introduction, have lead to the development of the Object
Oriented programming methodologies. We argue that the same principles must be
followed while writing the operational part (SCR tables) of any large SCR specification.
The responsibilities of the components should be stated by the property-based part of the
specification, creating a checklist for verification and validation of the components and
the system as a whole. The verification process is simplified if the properties are stated on
component boundaries (involving only the variables within a single component), as
advocated by Abadi and Lamport [41].
Given an SCR specification in tabular notation, dependencies between the variables can
be observed easily. Dependency chains end with controlled variables, which are
generated by the system and affect the environment, and start with the monitored
variables, which are used by the system to observe the changes in the environment. How
the monitored variables are used, and how the controlled variables are produced is
formally defined by the SCR specification and its constructs: tables, term variables, mode
class variables, etc.
Our hypothesis is that if a given SCR model has modular structure as advocated by
Parnas et al. in [15], then the boundaries of different subsystems in complex SCR
specifications can be automatically identified at the points of minimal coupling with the
rest of the specification. The expectation is that the subsystems generally transform
monitored variables into a smaller set of derived variables (term variables), which are
then further utilized to calculate the values of controlled variables.
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We use min-cut graph algorithms [8] on the dependency graphs to identify these points of
minimal coupling and decompose the system in smaller components. The overarching
idea is to apply a divide and conquer approach in the verification of SCR specifications.
The min-cuts result in partitioning of the set of variables. Each partition represents a
smaller component of the specification. Only the properties that involve the variables
contained in the given partition need to be used for its verification.
Because of the decreased state space of the components, we expect to avoid the state
explosion problem while performing model checking, or if it happens, the same
decomposition procedure can be applied recursively to the components of interest. After
each component has been validated, the resulting abstract model that will contain fewer
states should be validated.

4.1. Decomposition of Variable Dependency Graphs
One approach to specification decomposition has been presented in [6]. The authors
propose an algorithm for slicing system specifications represented with Colored Petri
Nets. The slicing is performed by selecting a particular node of interests (CPN place or
transition) and following the control flow of the CPN backwards in order to identify arcs,
places, guards and transitions that lead to that node. Cukic et al. [4] argue that slicing the
specification improves the understanding of the complex system models and helps with
identifying high-risk components early in the life cycle.

The underlying ideas are very similar to our current approach: We want to decompose
complex system specifications to smaller, more manageable and understandable parts.
Instead of ad-hoc decomposition criteria, we propose using minimum coupling, i.e., the
boundaries of system components should have minimal coupling (information exchange
and/or control connectivity) with the rest of the system.
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Several abstraction and slicing methods for SCR have been proposed in [12][61]. We
summarize them below.

1.

Removal of irrelevant variables.

This method is similar to the “program slicing” technique [40], which removes
irrelevant variables for the purpose of program analysis and understanding. Based on
the property that we want to verify, only the relevant variables for this particular
property obtained by reflexive and transitive closure on the dependency relation are
preserved. This method is fully automated and already implemented in the existing
SCR toolset.

2.

Removal of detailed monitored variables.

If a relevant variable for a given property is the only one that depends on a set of
monitored variables, then these monitored variables can be removed, and the relevant
variable can be treated as a monitored variable.

3.

Replacement of a detailed variable with an abstract variable.

In this case, the domain of a detailed variable is partitioned in equivalence classes and
its size (the number of distinct input values) is reduced to the number of classes
taking one representative for each class.
Methods 2 and 3 have not been fully automated [13]. We show how the min-cut graph
algorithm can be used to decompose SCR specifications, as well as to automate the
abstraction Method 2. Our methodology provides automatic abstraction of irrelevant
monitored variables and provides guidance on how to perform verification and validation
of system models. The specification and domain experts can focus their verification and
validation efforts by combining the results and providing evidence for the correctness of
the system as a whole.
In order to apply the min-cut algorithms, we transform the dependency graph produced
by the SCR tool to an undirected graph having specific properties of interest. In general,
we want to identify internal system variables that represent the points of minimal
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coupling and, consequently, module boundaries. Therefore, partitioning cuts can be
applied to the vertices of the dependency graph only, and not to the edges.
We will represent each variable v of the specification by two vertices vin and vout
connected by the undirected edge (vin, vout). The weight of the newly introduced edge will
depend on the type of the variable. We do not want to split monitored (input) and
controlled (output) variables, since they cannot imply meaningful system partitions.
Therefore, these edges will have infinite weight, w(vin, vout) = ∞. Conversely, term and
mode variables will have their weights set to 1, w(vin, vout) = 1. Each undirected edge
(v, u) of the dependency graph (vout, uin) will assume weight w(vout, uin) = ∞, as we do not
want to cut any existing dependency edges either.
This transformation is linear on the number of vertices and edges requiring O(n + m)
time. It produces an undirected graph with 2n vertices and m + n edges. The choice of the
cost of the edges in our transformed graph will force the min-cut algorithm to produce
cuts, as intended, on vertices only. Figure 6 presents an example of the dependency graph
transformation.

∞
v

∞

∞
vout

1

vin

∞

Figure 6: Transformation of the dependency graph to undirected graph.

The application of the min-cut algorithm will find a partitioning of the vertices of the
transformed graph in two sets, which minimizes the cost of the edges connecting the both
sets. Thus, the cut will contain one or more edges with cost 1 and no edges with infinite
cost, thus performing partition of the variables of the specification that crosses the
minimal number of variables. The min-cut algorithm can be recursively applied to the
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obtained partitions in order to further decompose the system. Since our transformation is
linear and does not expand significantly the size of the problem, the time required to
calculate the minimum cut is still polynomial with respect to the size of the specification.

Theorem 4: If an SCR variable r is the only variable which depends on several monitored

variables r1, r2, …, ri, then a minimum cut of the transformed graph will split this
variable.

r1out

∞

r1in
∞

…
ri-out

∞

∞
rout

∞

1

rin

∞

ri-in

Figure 7: Minimum cut of the transformed graph of a variable directly dependant on
several monitored variables.

The proof is intuitive, by construction (see Figure 7). If we generate the transformed
graph of this specific dependency, then the cut splitting the variable r has a cost of 1. This
is also a regular cut of the transformed graph because there are no other variables that
depend on the given set of monitored variables. Consequently, it is a valid minimum cut,
which will be identified by the algorithm.
■
Corollary 2: The proposed methodology automates the abstraction Method 2 – Removal

of Detailed Monitored Variables.

Corollary 2 follows directly from Theorem 4. Calculating the minimal cuts of the
transformed graph will automatically identify the variables to which this abstraction
method can be applied.
■
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The proposed methodology not only identifies the variables that directly depend on a set
of monitored variables, but it also identifies the variables that are deeper in the
dependency graph and have minimal coupling with the other parts of the system. These
variables, according to our hypothesis, are the “semi-controlled” variables defining the
boundaries of the subsystems contained in the specification. However, we must note that
this hypothesis might not hold, i.e., there are many ways one can write an SCR
specification for a given system, some of them better than others. Different specifications
might not follow generally recognized rules for writing good specifications. There is a list
of properties that a specification should have; for example: being complete, unambiguous
and minimal. However, from the V&V perspective, the most desired property and the
most difficult to achieve is for the specification to be easily verifiable. We argue that one
measure that provides insight if a specification is “open” to verification methodologies is
whether it is decomposable, and one such test is our proposed decomposition
methodology.

4.2. The Strategy for Verification of Decomposable Models
Based on the theory presented in Section 3.3, we propose the following strategy for
verification of decomposable models. As stated previously, the overarching idea is to
apply a divide and conquer approach in the verification of SCR specifications. The mincuts decomposition results in partitioning of the variables, where each partition
represents a smaller component of the complete specification. The verification of these
parts is performed against the properties involving only variables contained in the given
partition.
Jeffords and Heitmeyer in [59] present a strategy for verification that performs
abstraction by removing a single variable from the specification and uses the
automatically generated invariants [60] for the abstracted variable to strengthen the
deduction rules. They state that the problem on how to decompose a given system for
performing compositional verification is still open, and should be automatable and
accessible to non-experts. Our approach extends their work by considering components
of the specification (i.e. sets of variables) which have low coupling and information
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exchange with the rest of the specification. Instead of automatically generating invariants
for the abstracted components, our approach is to specify properties at the component
level and later try to prove that they are invariants and use them in the certification
process of the system as a whole.
Given a specification of a system Σ = (V, S, Θ, ρ) and a set P of desired properties to be
proven as invariants, we apply the following steps.
Step 1. Apply the decomposition algorithm to obtain partitioning of the set of

variables V, to disjoint subsets V1, V2, …, Vn.
According to our heuristic hypothesis, each of these sets should represent one component
of the system.
Step 2. Construct each component system Σi from Vi, i = 1 to n, and Σ as follows:

(a)

Delete from Θ the initial state definitions of variables in V – Vi , and

assign the result to Θi.
(b)

Delete from ρ the functions defining the variables in V – Vi, and assign the

result to ρi.
This step essentially makes all variables in V – Vi to behave as monitored variables for
the subsystem Σi,. In other words, by removing the functions defining them, these
variables can assume any allowed value non-deterministically. This introduces
incompleteness in the verification process in the following sense: in order to prove some
properties for the component that are necessary for the system correctness, we might need
to rely on some explicit or implicit assumptions that this component makes about its
environment or other interfacing components. The goal is to make all needed
assumptions explicit during the specification process, i.e. the created verification
checklist of properties should be complete in order to allow verification of the system.
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Step 3. For each component Σi select those properties from the set P that depend only

on the variables found in Vi . Try to prove that these properties are invariants for the
component and, consequently, from the corollary of Theorem 3, invariants for the
system.
Our minimum cut decomposition approach guarantees that the component Σi has the least
number of dependencies on other system variables. Consequently, this selection of
properties ensures that most of the variables V – Vi will be abstracted away by using the
abstraction method 1 and reduces the incompleteness of the component verification
process.
Step 4. Use the compositional verification rules together with the invariants proven in

the previous step to prove the rest of the properties, or those properties which have
failed in step 3.
Each derived component represents an abstraction of the complete system. However,
components usually allow auxiliary behaviors that might invalidate the properties we
would like to prove. The min-cut decomposition approach minimizes the dependency of a
single component on external variables, thus reducing auxiliary behaviors and making it
often possible to prove invariants for the system without using extra invariants.
Step 5. The properties that depend on variables contained in several components can

be demonstrated in parts if they can be represented as conjunction of component
properties. Or, they can be proven by creating larger subsystems from unions of the
required sets of variables Vi ∪ Vj and repeating the steps 2, 3 and 4.
Assuming that a given system specification Σ is decomposable; the proposed strategy
should improve the time and memory requirements for verification of the system
properties. In Chapter 7 we demonstrate how an SCR specification, which originally was
not decomposable, can be refactored into a decomposable specification. We identify the
main principles for designing decomposable specifications and use the proposed strategy
to verify the required system properties.
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4.3. Combining Verification and Testing results
Because of the scalability problems with formal methods and the common use of testing,
combining both methodologies has been an obvious research goal. The main argument
behind this combination implies that software reliability can be increased by applying
different analysis methods. Sharygina and Peled [49] propose a combined methodology
of testing the checked model against the actual code, as part of applying formal methods
(Figure 8). More information on the subject of can be found in Peled's book [19].
Another approach for combining testing with formal models is for the purposes of
automatic generation of tests [5][42]. Based on coverage measures of the formal
specification model, model checking is used in order automatically to generate tests
suites. These test suites are later used on the actual code. Many researchers have
investigated models for reliability estimation based on code coverage. It would be
interesting to add the specification coverage into the picture, and see what the correlation
is.

modeling
Code

Model
testing

Errors
corrections

corrections

model checking

error analysis
Verification
Results
(Error traces)

Figure 8: Combining Testing and Model Checking.
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Partition software testing is also a promising area to introduce formal specification
models. There is plenty of research being done on comparing randomized testing with
partition testing, pointing out when it is more beneficial to use one or the other [52].
However, currently domain partitioning is largely an informal process. Specification
models can be used to derive the domain partitioning and test generation based on
obtained equivalence classes.
Our interest is mainly on the validation of the formalization phase, i.e., whether the
formal specification and its model are correct with respect to the informally captured
requirements. If a correct formal model has been obtained, we can use other techniques
like rewriting (program synthesis) to obtain correct executable code [26].

4.3.1. Standard component based Reliability Estimation

In the SCR model, a single update step sequentially executes the function definitions of
the specification modifying the affected variables accordingly. For example, in Figure 9
we see the source code of the update step of the SIS specification that is automatically
generated from the code.
void step ( )
{
update_MajorityLow ( ) ;
update_MajorityPermit ( ) ;
update_PermitStatus ( ) ;
update_OVERRIDEN ( ) ;
update_M_Pressure ( ) ;
update_Safety_Injection ( ) ;
check_assumptions ( ) ;
}

Figure 9: Executable C code for the SIS specification.

According to standard reliability models, the reliability of the single step of execution
will be the product of the estimated reliabilities of each of the functions, or in the SCR
case, the tables specifying the variables vi, i = 1..n. The assumptions are that component
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failures are independent and that there is no error propagation between the components
[51].
R(S) = R(v1) · R(v2) · R(v3) · R(v4) · … · R(vn)
Our decomposition algorithm generates partitions of these variables, which we consider
to be components. Consequently, we can rearrange and rewrite the reliability equation
combining the parts representing a single component, and present the system reliability as
the reliability of components.
R(S) = R(c1) · R(c2) · R(c3) · … · R(ck)
In case a component is formally verified, i.e., all corresponding properties have been
demonstrated to hold, it is usually assumed that its reliability is R(ci) = 1. If the formal
verification is out of reach, we can apply standard reliability growth models based on
testing to estimate the component reliabilities. As we have stated previously, reliability
growth models cannot be applied to high assurance systems, however they still can be
used for systems or components that are not highly critical.
These approaches are rather simplistic and based on assumptions that are difficult to
justify and rarely hold in practice. We propose a different correctness estimation
approach, which is based on the stated properties about the components and the system.

4.3.2. Property-based Correctness Estimation
The list of stated properties represents our “check-list,” which must be demonstrated in
order to certify the correctness of the system. This list must be complete and take into
account all required aspects of the system operation. Ideally, we would like to be able to
formally verify and demonstrate the correctness of each of these properties and
consequently the correctness of the system. However, we are faced often with scalability
problems in applying formal methods, and we must rely on standard quality assurance
techniques like testing or manual inspection. Once in the realm of informal techniques,
usually we cannot be 100% sure of the validation outcome and think in the terms of
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probabilities of correct execution of the system, system failure rates, or reliabilities. Thus,
the probability that our system is correct is equal to the probability that all stated
properties are correct. Since we are dealing with high assurance systems, no observed
failures of the properties are tolerated. If a property is observed as failed during testing or
verification, then the system is considered as not being correct.

The properties can be dependent on each other, i.e. we do not assume that they are all
independent. The dependency emerges from the assumptions that some of the component
make about their environment that are needed in order for them to operate correctly and
establish their invariants. These assumptions must be stated as properties and eventually
proven for the respective interfacing components, i.e. the list of the properties must be
complete, allowing verification of all stated properties. The independent properties would
be the first ones that will be proven by applying our verification strategy. They are used
in the next iteration in order to prove other properties that might depend on them, and we
repeat this process until all properties have been proven as invariants for the system.
When performing verification of the complete system by using model checking, we are
trying to establish the correctness of the formula:
S = α1 ∧ α2 ∧ α3 ∧ … ∧ αn. (Eq. 12)
where αi are the stated system properties. If our verification task is unsuccessful, we
should try to estimate the probability of this formula being true. For systems that are not
highly critical this is usually done by performing testing of the complete system, looking
for failures of the stated properties and using reliability growth models.
The problem on how to quantify this probability for high assurance systems or when
there are no failures observed remains open. One suggestion might be to use the fraction
of the explored states and the total states of the system, or try to incorporate other
coverage measures like the structural coverage (to be presented in Chapter 5). Since the
testing or verification in this case is performed on the complete system, we do not need to

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 4: Component-based Verification

51

make the assumptions of the components explicit – they are incorporated in the system
model.
PΣ(S) = PΣ(α1 ∧ α2 ∧ α3 ∧ … ∧ αn) = PΣ(α1) · PΣ(α2) · PΣ(α3) ·… · PΣ(αn). (Eq.13)
When dealing with large systems, we are faced with the limits of the state exploration
methodologies and rarely can verify the properties on the complete system. Our
component-based verification strategy breaks up the verification task on components.
The advocated approach is that each component should state the properties that are
guaranteed based on assumptions about the environment and the other components it
depends on.
Due to the performed abstractions, establishing the correctness of a property might be
dependent on other properties. Therefore, during the application of our verification
strategy, we try first to demonstrate the correctness of properties that are independent on
other properties, and later use them as assumptions in the verification process. In general,
assuming the properties are ordered according to their dependencies and there is a single
property per component, the verification process can be decomposed as following:
PΣ(S) = PΣ(α1 ∧ α2 ∧ α3 ∧ … ∧ αn) ≥ PΣ1(α1) · PΣ-Σ1(α2 ∧ α3 ∧ … ∧ αn | α1)
≥ PΣ1(α1) · PΣ2(α2|α1) · PΣ-Σ1-Σ2(α3 ∧ … ∧ αn | α1 ∧ α2)

(Eq. 14)

≥ PΣ1(α1) · PΣ2(α2|α1) · PΣ3(α3|α1 ∧ α2) · … · PΣn (αn | α1 ∧ α2 ∧ α3 ∧ … ∧ αn - 1).
The dependencies between the properties, or at least between the components on which
the properties are stated, are evident on the dependency graphs of the SCR specification
under analysis. In general, each component implicitly depends on properties established
for components that precede it in the dependency graph. This formula is similar to the
standard component reliability estimate formula, but it stresses that correctness of
components must be evaluated in the context of their application. Recent work in such
component-based reliability frameworks for the special case when components have no
internal states is presented by Hamlet et al. [18].

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 4: Component-based Verification

52

Consequently, if the proof of a property is out of reach, we must estimate the probability
of correctness using either the complete system as in (Eq. 13) or component-based
evaluation as given in (Eq. 14).

4.4. Example Application of Decomposition
We demonstrate our methodology of component-based verification and combining
testing and formal analysis by applying it to the described Safety Injection System
specification.

The dependency between the variables in an SCR specification can be visualized by
using the Dependency Graph Browser tool of the SCR toolset. Figure 10 presents the
dependency graph for the Safety Injection specification.

Figure 10: Dependency Graph of the Safety Injection SCR specification.

The SCR model keeps track of two values for each variable at any distinct point of time –
the current value, and the next state, or the “new” value. A change in one of the
monitored variables, e.g., setting the next state value of the Block variable to true while
the current value is false, will cause update in the variables that depend upon new value
of Block. However, dependencies can also exist on the previous value of a specific
variable, so the complete dependency graph contains both types of dependencies
(dependency on the new values, and dependency on the old values). If we select to draw
the dependency only on the new values, we would get the same graph as in Figure 10,
except that the arrows connecting M_Pressure and PermitStatus to themselves would not
be there. Figure 11 presents the dependency graph for the old values of the variables.
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Figure 11: Dependency of the variables on the "old" values.

Performing the decomposition on different types of graphs can provide additional insight
on the cohesion between the components and the types of dependency between them –
whether they depend on the “new” or “old” value of some component.
We implemented our decomposition methodology using a combination of JAVA and C
implementations of the minimum cut algorithms [76]. From a given SCR specification,
we extract the dependency graph information using the SCR toolset, and then use our tool
to perform the decomposition. Currently, the prototype tool just reads the extracted
dependency information and outputs the names of the variables that belong to different
min-cut partitions of the dependency graph. Further analysis and application of our
verification strategy is performed manually using the SCR toolset. In future, we plan to
incorporate the decomposition algorithms within the SCR toolset, thus automating the
application of our verification strategy. In addition, we noticed the need to allow the user
to assign different weights to the dependency graph edges, guiding the min-cut
partitioning as mentioned in Section 7.2.

4.4.1 Decomposition of the specification
The results of applying our decomposition algorithm on the complete dependency graph
“SISall.dg” are given in Figure 12. The main module responsible for pressure monitoring
and the incorporated majority voting has been identified, and we obtain the same
decomposition as presented in Figure 5. Often the dependency on the old variables is
what makes the dependency graph more complex and limits the identification of
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components by our algorithm. This can be resolved in several ways, either by possibly
relaxing the costs of cuts on some of the dependency links (e.g. the “old” dependencies),
or by running the decomposition algorithm on both dependency graphs as we decided to
do in this example. Therefore, we perform additional run on the dependency information
for the new values “SISnew.dg” (Figure 13).

Input the name of the dependencies file: SISall.dg
Cut 1: cost = 2
MajorityLow_OUT, MajorityPermit_OUT, PB_OUT, PB_IN, PG_OUT, PG_IN,
PR_OUT, PR_IN,

the rest of the system:
M_Pressure_OUT, M_Pressure_IN, PermitStatus_OUT, PermitStatus_IN,
Block_OUT, Block_IN, MajorityLow_IN, MajorityPermit_IN, OVERRIDDEN_OUT,
OVERRIDDEN_IN, Reset_OUT, Reset_IN, Safety_Injection_OUT,
Safety_Injection_IN,

No more cuts.

Figure 12: Decomposition of the complete dependency graph of the SIS specification.
Input the name of the dependencies file: SISnew.dg
Cut 1: cost = 2
M_Pressure_IN, OVERRIDDEN_IN, Safety_Injection_OUT,
Safety_Injection_IN,
Cut 2: cost = 1
PermitStatus_IN, Block_OUT, Block_IN, OVERRIDDEN_OUT, Reset_OUT,
Reset_IN,
Cut 3: cost = 2
M_Pressure_OUT, PermitStatus_OUT, MajorityLow_IN, MajorityPermit_IN,

the rest of the system:
MajorityLow_OUT, MajorityPermit_OUT, PB_OUT, PB_IN, PG_OUT, PG_IN,
PR_OUT, PR_IN,

No more cuts.

Figure 13: Decomposition of the "new" dependency graph of the SIS specification.
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In addition to the above-identified component, the rest of the system was decomposed in
3 modules (Figure 14). Having the decomposed specification, we can proceed with the
validation and verification tasks.

Figure 14: Decomposed Safety Injection SCR specification.

4.4.2. Verification of the Properties

The assumption of our methodology is that we have defined the complete list of
properties that provide assurance in the correctness of the given specification. For this
example, we will use the following properties:
Voting: (PG >= permit) AND (PR >= permit) => NOT (MajorityPermit OR MajorityLow)
OverrideWorks: Reset = ON => not OVERRIDDEN
InjectionOff: (PG >= permit) AND (PR >= permit) => (Safety_Injection = OFF)

Although this list is far from being complete, it is useful for the demonstration of the
methodology.
As we mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the problem we encounter when performing model
checking of the complete specification with SPIN is the large state space of the voting
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component. Thus, after identification of the components by our decomposition algorithm,
we will first try to prove the properties that are stated on component boundaries.
The property Voting includes only variables from the voting component and this
component does not depend on any other components. Unfortunately, since the input
domain of this component is very large, SPIN is unable to demonstrate the correctness of
this property using the available memory, but also does not find violations.
OverrideWorks includes only variables from control component identified by the first
decomposition. Figure 15 presents the results of model checking the control component
for this property, demonstrating that it holds for the reduced system. We performed the
full state-space search. It took only a few seconds using 35MB of memory. Consequently,
this property also holds for the complete system.

(Spin Version 4.2.5 -- 2 April 2005)
Full statespace search for:
never claim

- (not selected)

assertion violations +
cycle checks

- (disabled by -DSAFETY)

invalid end states

+

State-vector 16 byte, depth reached 109, errors: 0
402 states, stored
61 states, matched
463 transitions (= stored+matched)
0 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
Stats on memory usage (in Megabytes):
0.008

equivalent memory usage for states (stored*(State-vector + overhead))

0.300

actual memory usage for states (unsuccessful compression: 3732.29%)

State-vector as stored = 742 byte + 4 byte overhead
33.554

memory used for hash table (-w23)

0.140

memory used for DFS stack (-m5000)

0.097

memory lost to fragmentation

33.899

total actual memory usage

Figure 15: Model checking the control component.
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The InjectionOff property includes variables from both components, and as we know
model checking the complete system with SPIN will be infeasible. Therefore, we use
deduction rules to try to prove if this property holds for the control component, assuming
that the Voting property is true. We try to present this property as a conjunction, as
suggested in Step 5 of our verification strategy.
InjectionOff = Voting ∧ NOT (MajorityPermit OR MajorityLow) => Safety_Injection = OFF

The second part of the conjunction now includes only variables from the control
component, and is successfully verified by SPIN. Consequently, we can conclude that if
the Voting property holds, the complete checklist can be verified and we can certify the
correctness of the system. By using other tools like SMV and Salsa we were able to prove
the Voting property, demonstrating the effectiveness of symbolic model checking and
inductive theorem proving tools vs. state based model checking in this particular case.
If we were unable to establish the correctness or the failure of the Voting property, we
would need to give an estimate of our belief that it holds true. The most obvious approach
is to calculate the fraction of the explored states and the total states of the corresponding
component. Thus, the estimate of the correctness of the system in this case according to
our methodology would be:
P(S) ≥ Pvoter(Voting) · Pcontrol(SafetyOff | Voting) · Pcontrol(OverrideWorks) =

= Pvoter(Voting) · 1 · 1 =

Voter : explored states Voter : explored states
≥
.
Voter : reachable states
Voter : total states

4.4.3. Testing the specification
The properties that have not been proven correct must be evaluated either by testing or by
inspection. In Chapters 5 and 6, we describe the approaches used for testing and
validation of SCR specifications. We evaluate the effectiveness of random testing
approaches for early fault detection and investigate the achieved structural coverage
measures. We also advocate the use of visual environments for manual testing purposes.
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Using these visual environments, the domain expert can execute scenarios of the system
operation and observe the system responses visually. The tools track the coverage of the
executed tests, and store the scenarios for recording and certification purposes (e.g. the
same scenarios can be re-executed if the specification changes, observing the differences
in the induced coverage between both versions). For example, in Figure 24 we see that
during the testing, MajorityPermit and MajorityLow variables have reached 100%
coverage, increasing our confidence that their specifications are correct and providing
evidence of the correctness of the Voting property.
These testing coverage metrics are defined on structural artifacts of the given
specifications (e.g. events or conditions), and are different from the state-space coverage.
Achieving complete (100%) state-space coverage ensures the correctness of the property
under verification, while complete structural test coverage is not sufficient to make this
claim. It just provides further evidence of the correctness of the specification.
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Chapter 5. Testing and Coverage of Formal Models

Chapter 5
Testing and Coverage of Formal Models

Software systems pose significant challenges for quality assessment. This is mainly
caused by the prohibitive complexity of many practical software applications. Despite the
enthusiasm in the research community about the development of formal methods for
software verification and validation, they are rarely used in industry, due, in part, to
scalability problems. Many current software applications are outside of the reach of
formal verification approaches and tools. Consequently, testing is the dominant
methodology currently used in industry to assess the quality of software.
Software testing has another set of limitations. It is incomplete, so not encountering a
failure during the testing phase does not mean that the software is fault-free. If performed
manually, it leads to increased costs of the software development process since it is labor
intensive and depends on the specialized skills of the testers to find bugs in the code.
Thus, the tendency is to automate the testing process, either by creating automated test
case replay tools, or by randomly generating input sequences and using an oracle to
validate the correctness of the output.
In the case of the replay tools, the burden is moved to creation of the test case database
and its maintenance as the system evolves. Random Testing [56] on the other hand can
generate a large number of input cases automatically; however, the development of the
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oracle that would distinguish the failures during test execution is usually not an easy task.
If the oracle produces too many false positives needing human review and resolution, it
would significantly increase the cost, while false negatives would result in undetected
errors in the code.
One approach to the oracle problem, especially in the domain of high assurance systems,
is to use software requirements specifications written in some formal notation as an
oracle [14][63]. The main assumption in this methodology is that the formal model of the
system representing the requirements specification is “correct.” Having a correct formal
model can be very beneficial in the software development process since it can be used for
automated generation of tests based on defined coverage metrics on the model [5], or it
can be used for automated generation of source code which might represent an initial
implementation of the system [26]. In our research, we are focusing on methodologies
that can be used to verify such formal software models.

5.1. Random Testing of Formal Models
Our motivation is based on observation that incomplete random testing tools can be used
most effectively early in the modeling process, e.g., while writing the SCR requirements
specification for a given system. In this phase, we are still not sure if we have built the
correct model or have correctly identified and stated the properties that the model must
satisfy. Therefore, it is useful to have a way to quickly identify errors in the operational
model or in the properties themselves, and make appropriate corrections early in the
lifecycle.
As we get closer to a final version of the SCR requirements specification, having
corrected the errors detected by testing, we can then apply complete verification tools like
SPIN, if feasible, to demonstrate the consistency between the operational model and the
stated properties.
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We use a prototype simulation tool for random testing and debugging of models of finitestate concurrent systems called Lurch [17]. Although Lurch's exploration of the state
space is not exhaustive, it can be used to detect errors in large systems quickly using
much less memory than any complete-search alternatives. Lurch uses a Monte Carlo, not
Las Vegas, random search algorithm [57] in contrast to, for example, a random depthfirst search, in which all nodes are explored but the order is random. Where random
search has been used recently in model checking by others, e.g. [3], it has been primarily
the Las Vegas approach; this is fundamentally different from our approach as it requires
the record keeping of conventional deterministic model checking (the search must keep
track of states previously visited) and therefore can not scale to models as large.
To do cycle detection, Lurch stores a hash value for each unique global state in the
current path. This requires some additional time and memory and can be turned off if the
user is not interested in looking for cycle-based faults. Using the hash value storage
needed for cycle detection, Lurch implements an early stopping mechanism that works in
the following way: for each path generated, we save hash values for all unique global
states visited (this is done already for cycle detection) and compare the number of
collisions to the number of new values. When the percentage of new values drops below
a user-defined saturation threshold (default is 0.01%), the search is terminated. In our
experiments, saturation is usually achieved quickly. In addition, when Lurch is allowed to
run to saturation, it nearly always produces consistent results identifying the same errors
in different test runs of the given model.
The hash values can be also used to determine the number of explored states of the
model, providing a way to estimate the probability that a given property holds for the
system under analysis. We use this measure as discussed in Section 4.3.2.
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5.2. Structural Test Coverage of SCR specifications
During testing or simulation of an SCR specification, we can monitor the structural
coverage achieved by the test. These coverage measures represent the extent to which
particular parts of the specification have been exercised during testing and increase our
confidence in the correctness of the specification. Parts that have good coverage tend to
have fewer faults, since the probability of detecting them during the testing phase is
greater than in the parts that have achieved lower coverage. However, the exact
relationship between code reliability and coverage measures is still an open problem.
There are two types of coverage that can be defined on underlying constructs of SCR
specifications, similar to ones defined in [5] or [42], which are primarily used for
automated generation of test cases using the specification as “correct” oracle. The first
one is variable domain coverage, which tracks if all possible values of a specific
variable’s domain have been assigned to it by the test cases. Tacking the variable domain
coverage is only feasible for domains with small bounds, like enumerated types or
booleans. The second one is branch coverage, which tracks if all possible branches
defined by events or conditions in the SCR tables have been executed.

Modes for mcStatus
CheckCard
Error
ReEnterCard
tNumCReads' =

Table 10: tNumCReads event table.
Events
@T(mCardValid) OR @C(mReset)
@C(mOverride) OR @C(mReset)
@C(mReset)
0

@F(mCardValid)
NEVER
NEVER
tNumCReads + 1

Table 10 presents the event table for the tNumCReads term variable of the PACS system
described in Section 7.1. This variable counts the number of unsuccessful card reads for
the current user trying to obtain access through the system. Depending on the current
value of the mcStatus variable and the events described in the cells of the table,
tNumCReads is either set to zero or increased by one. The keyword NEVER denotes an

event that can never become true.
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The branch coverage measures how many times each event in the cells was evaluated to
TRUE and to FALSE when the corresponding guard condition was satisfied. For example,
for the cell in the first row and second column of Table 10 we count how many times the
event @F(mCardValid) is evaluated to TRUE or to FALSE when the mcStatus variable is
equal to CheckCard during the execution of the test. If there is no guard condition (i.e. for
modeless tables), we consider that the guard is always satisfied. This coverage measure
can be further extended to include more than just TRUE and FALSE cases by creating
different sets of variables used in the conditions following the ideas of [5] and [24].
The other coverage measure, the variable domain coverage, tracks if all possible values
of a specific variable domain have been assigned to it by test cases. The SCR tool itself
warns the specifier if some of the values for a given enumerated variable are not used in
the specification. With this coverage, we measure how many of them were used by a
given test case. If an SCR table contains all the possible assignment values for the
variable, then it is easy to see that complete TRUE transition coverage implies complete
variable domain coverage, because each of the value assignments must have occurred
during the test run. However, for variables with larger domains (e.g. integers like
tNumCReads in Table 10) it is often impractical to track this coverage, so we mostly
focused on the branch coverage.
It is interesting to compare the defined specification branch coverage to the source code
branch coverage. Both, the generated java source code by the SCR toolset, and the
automatically generated C code follow the following structure.
if (guard_condition) {
if (cell_condition) {
update_variable;
}
}

Thus, the observed specification branch coverage closely matches the source code branch
coverage within the functions defining the variables of the specification. We expect that
any test cases that are executed on the specification, or generated from it, will achieve the
same or comparable branch coverage measures on the generated source code.
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5.3. Empirical Evaluation of Random Testing
In order to evaluate the efficacy of our random testing approach, we performed a
mutation testing experiment. We created 50 error-seeded versions of the PACS
specification by hand (PACS is described in Section 7.1, and the original SCR
specification is given in Appendix A.1.). Each error-seeded specification contained one
error not detectable by automatic checking features of the SCR Tool. For example, since
syntax errors or errors involving circular dependencies are detectable by the SCR Tool,
we did not use these for seeding. The mutation operations used were:


Change of operators;



Change of integer and boolean values;



Change of variable names.

We believe that these are typical human errors which occur in regular SCR specifications,
and should not skew our mutation testing results [30].
We used translation tools to create SPIN and Lurch versions of each error-seeded
specification. All error-seeded SCR specifications resulted in syntactically correct SPIN
and Lurch input models. We then ran SPIN and Lurch on the 50 error-seeded
specifications.
To give an idea of the scale of the experiments, for a verification run of the Promela
model generated from the original correct SCR specification, SPIN explored 180 million
states. Without compression, the verification would have required 6.8 GB of memory. In
order to perform a full verification run, we used the minimized automaton compression
option, set for a state vector of 44 bytes, and had to increase the depth limit for the search
to 3.2 million steps (default is 10,000). This verification run took about 30 minutes on a
2.5 GHz desktop machine with 512 MB of memory.
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5.3.1. Error Detection
SPIN with the settings appropriate to perform the complete verification, detected property
violations in 43 of the 50 specifications. We assume that for the remaining 7
specifications the seeded errors did not cause violations of any specified properties and
consider that they are equivalent to the original correct specification. All defined
properties for the PACS specification were simple safety properties, represented as
assertions in the SPIN and Lurch models.
For 35 of the 50 error-seeded specifications, Lurch detected a property violation. Because
of Lurch's incomplete random search, it is possible to obtain different results in different
runs. So, we ran Lurch 10 times on each specification, with default options (including the
“saturation'” stopping criterion described previously). The maximum time for any Lurch
run was about 15 seconds. For all but two of the specifications, Lurch found violations in
either all or none of the runs. We counted Lurch as detecting violations only if they were
found in all ten runs.
Consequently, the random testing approach in Lurch was successful in identifying
81.39% of the mutants requiring a small fraction of the time needed to perform the
complete verification by using SPIN.

5.3.2. Induced Coverage
As a second part of the experiment we wanted to take a closer look at the induced
structural coverage of the performed tests on the PACS SCR model.
The input sequences generated by the Lurch tool were exercised by instrumented
simulators of the SCR models tracking the previously defined coverage measures. Table
11 gives the cumulative coverage numbers for portion of the variable definitions from a
single Lurch run on the correct specification. Some of the variables have more than 6
cells, and we have truncated the table because of space constraints. In this table we can
find the defined branch coverage of all 6 cells of the Table 10 specifying the
tNumCReads variable. Note that the cells having NEVER event (cells 4 and 6) have
zeros for their TRUE coverage measures, since this event can never become true. We can

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 5: Testing and Coverage

66

also see that the event @F(mCardValid) (cell 2 in Table 10) was evaluated to true 3219
times and to false 18025 times when it was in scope (the mcStatus variable was equal to
CheckCard).
Table 11: Cumulative coverage measures for the PACS Specification.
cell

1

2

3

4

5

6

coverage totals

TRUE

FALSE

TRUE

FALSE

TRUE

FALSE

TRUE

FALSE

TRUE

FALSE

TRUE

FALSE

mcPIN

3762

145220

1078

18885

242

4334

225

4351

60

996

57

999

12

25803

5

35

2

31

3206

46166

mPINInput

12

25043

mcStatus

12685

75881

3758

45614

cGate

75

175071

175071

75

cGuardAlarm

63

175083

175083

63

cGuardDisplay

12443

162703

13

175133

cUserDisplay

12434

162712

3206

171940

3758

171388

4

175142

14

175132

13

175133

tNumCReads

10921

10323

3219

18025

13

6

0

19

1563

3183

0

4746

tNumPReads

8

11

4

15

13

12

0

25

4

2

0

6

From the Table 11 we can conclude that the uniform random testing performed by Lurch
does not result in uniformity of the measured coverage across the model. For example,
notice the difference in the coverage between the tNumCReads variable, and the
tNumPReads variable. Although these two variables are very similar (one counts the
number of incorrect card reads, and the other counts the number of incorrect PIN reads)
and they have almost the same specification tables, tNumCReads has been more
extensively covered than tNumPReads. This is caused by the fact that there is a sequence
of specific events in the system that needs to be executed for a person to be validated.
The probability of the uniform event generation to explore this sequence decreases
exponentially with its length.
Thus, having parts of the specification receive low coverage makes it possible for errors
not to be detected with the random testing approach. One solution might be to increase
the depth of the generated random probes, or to give Lurch more time to exercise the
model, or both. We can use the defined coverage measures as a stopping criterion to
determine when to stop the random testing.
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We compared the induced coverage by the same event sequence generated by Lurch on
the correct specification, and the faulty specifications with the idea that deviations might
point out the undetected mutant specifications. Our findings were inconclusive - there
were mutant specifications which had different degrees of deviation of the coverage from
the correct one. We observed faulty specifications with the same coverage measures as
the correct one, as well as faulty specifications with large difference in the induced
coverage from the correct one.
Another approach to even-out the induced coverage by random testing tools like Lurch is
to use different probabilities for input event generation instead of generating the input
sequences uniformly. The strategy may represent the operational profile of the system
under test. These probabilities can be modeled, for example, by using Markov models as
described in [27].
In our case study with the PACS specification, there are two variables (mReset and
mOverride) having low probability of occurrence in the real system (less than 1%).
However, they have a big effect of taking the system to the initial state. Therefore, during
the course of our random testing, a change in one of these variables severely limits the
depth of our exploration. As a crude experiment, we removed the generation of these
events from the Lurch model, and that resulted in the successful identification of the
remaining 8 mutants which were not detected in the initial test runs.
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Chapter 6
Using Visual Interfaces for Validation

A specifier, based on the informal specification from the user (or the domain expert),
writes the formal system specification. This formal specification is based on the mental
model (understanding of the system) that the specifier develops. It should be complete,
minimal and consistent with respect to the domain expert’s informal specification. After
the mental model has been developed, it is mapped into a formal domain, usually written
in some form of formal notation or a domain specific language (e.g. SCR [10][13], Z
[31], Relational Specifications [47], etc.)
There are two sources of errors that can arise during the formalization process. The first
source is the incomplete understanding of the informal specification (or the domain)
resulting in the development of an incorrect system model. Second, the specifier can
introduce errors by incorrectly mapping the (possibly correct) mental model into the
formal domain. Both of these types of errors can be discovered to some extent by
consistency and completeness checks and this procedure can be automated [9]. However,
completeness and consistency are necessary, but not sufficient conditions in assuring that
the developed model is correct.
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The mathematical formulas that express the system can be very complicated even if the
system itself is of moderate size. System complexity increases the possibility that errors
are included in the formal specification. The major difficulty lies in our ability to
correctly express system behavior in terms of symbolic formulas. Research has been
conducted on how to write and structure these formulas to support incremental
understanding [9][50]. Our research further addresses this issue of improving the
understanding of formal specifications, but in a graphical framework.
Another issue in the formalization phase is the domain expert’s understanding of the
formal specification. Often the domain expert does not have the expertise in the specific
form of formal notation and cannot validate whether the formal specification really
captures all the desired features of the system correctly. This is the validation problem.
One of the proposed solutions is to have two specification groups that develop the
specifications independently. The first group is responsible for development of the formal
specification while the second group provides redundant information that can be used to
validate the specification developed by the first group [47]. The drawback of this process
is the fact that the domain expert is not involved in the validation, although he/she is the
one that possesses the most complete knowledge of the required system behavior.
Formal Boundary
Domain Expert

Visual Model

Symbolic Model

Physical Model

Specifier
Informal Side

Formal Side

Figure 16: Using Visual Models for Validation.
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The domain expert can be included in the process of validating formal specification if the
specification is rewritten in some easily understandable notation. Candidate notations are
natural languages or visual models, but the automated rewriting is far from being simple.
By using graphical representation of the formal system model, the domain expert is
included in the validation process. The specifier also benefits because the visual model
increases his/her ability to construct the correct mental model and assists in the process of
mapping this mental model to formal notations. Figure 16 depicts our intention to use the
visual model as a bridge over the typical boundary between the domain expert’s
knowledge and the formal model, which (supposedly) captures it.
Many simulation researchers extensively explored the process of visualizing simulation
models [11], and today visualization has become a critical component of simulation
technology. Some of the aspects where visualization is found to be very beneficial in
simulations (as identified in [39]) are the following:
•

Verification and Validation – The logic model and the real-world behavior can

be verified by watching the model. Animation, combined with sound statistical
analysis, is an unmatched approach to evaluating how good a model really is.
•

Understanding of Results – Often when the outcome from a model is not

understood, the animation can provide insight. By watching the area(s) of interest,
the modeler can “see” what is happening and understand how the dynamic
behavior of the system affects the results.
•

Communication of Results – Visualization is critical in communicating the

outcome of a simulation to the non-technical audience. Watching a few minutes
of visualization can eliminate hours of long tedious discussions.
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6.1. Visualization of SCR specifications
The SCR simulator has built in capabilities for visualization of specifications (see Figure
17). By using the developed visual objects given in the simulator palette, the users can
visualize the variables used in a given SCR specification, and in a fast and efficient
manner create a visual interface that can be used for the testing and validation of the
specification. The palette is still work in progress, and it has limited number of visual
objects that can be used (sliders, drop-down boxes, and picture changing elements). For
the time being, their behavior is limited to displaying different pictures or text strings
based on the values of the variables. Although limited, this behavior is enough to create
rich visual interfaces for specifications where simple “point and click to change”
interface is possible. However, if there is a need of more sophisticated display and
interaction behavior where the user needs to drag or move some elements of the visual
interface, we need to implement those objects in Java and add them to the interface, or
find some existing implementations of similar objects and import them to the palette.

Figure 17: SCR simulator with the default interface for the Safety Injection System.
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Our research was focused on extending the SCR simulator. We investigated how existing
and established visualization libraries can be used to create visual interfaces for SCR
specifications, and how we can use the developed visual objects to enrich the existing
simulator palette with minimal amount of programming required.

6.1.1. Altia Design
Altia Design [77] is a sophisticated graphics design environment. It is used for building
animated, interactive graphical objects, which can be combined to create visual
interfaces. The Altia Design Editor can be used to create the visualization and define the
behavior and connections between the components and the external environment without
any additional programming. Altia also provides libraries with great looking pre-built
components. The design procedure in Altia Design is performed in four steps:
1. Drawing the graphics. The Graphics Editor can be used to draw components,
import photo-realistic bitmap graphics from scanned images, or use the available
components from the Altia libraries.
2. Define the behavior. Altia Animation tool is used to define the motion and
appearance of objects by directly manipulating the object with the Graphics
Editor. The Stimulus tool is used to define the interaction of the component with
the user – mouse clicks, mouse motion, keystrokes, timer, etc. The Control tool is
used to define more sophisticated behavior and component interaction.
3. Identify Properties. Once the components are built they can be packaged for
reuse. The Properties tool is used to select number of properties that will be
available to other users, such as color, font size, minimum and maximum.
4. Add connections. Once the objects are constructed and the visual interface is
designed, it should be connected to the external simulator or code. Connection
tool is used to define the connections between the different objects as well as the
external environment.
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Figure 19: Interface code and Altia designed SIS panel.
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Figure 18 represents designed Safety Injection System (SIS) specification visual interface
with the Altia Design and the defined connections between the components themselves as
well as the external variables. We have used some of the existing objects in the Altia
libraries (meter, slider, button, led, and some background objects) to create this visual
interface. In order to connect the Altia Design with the SCR specification simulator, we
have implemented a connection interface in Java, using the Altia Java APIs. Figure 19
represents a simulation of the SIS specification using the developed visual interface.
Altia has a large number of pre-existing components which have very nice photo-realistic
design. However, changing the elements is complicated. Also, the designed objects can
not be integrated with the SCR simulator palette and used in the SCR simulator – the
designed visual interface must be run by the Altia runtime.
Although Altia has a large collection of very well designed visual components and the
existence of Java APIs allows easy connection with the SCR specification simulator, we
consider it only an external visual interface design tool that can be used to visualize SCR
specification, and no integration with the SCR simulator is possible.

6.1.2. JLOOX
The JLOOX [78] visualization package has the similar components as the previously
described Altia Designer. The JLooxMaker application is used to create visual designs
without any additional programming. Visual objects can be designed using the drawing
functions, created from imported pictures or external CAD programs, like AutoCad, or
created from the pre-existing set of components. The designer defines the animations or
possible user interactions with the components by using the appropriate tools. The
number and the quality of the pre-existing components are not as good as the Altia
package. However, the ease of creation of new dynamic objects and their modification
for reuse is much better with JLOOX. Because JLOOX is entirely written in Java it is
possible for the created components to be encapsulated like Java beans and imported into
the SCR simulator palette.
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The creation of dynamic objects (the objects that allow user interaction) is performed by
selecting one of the DYNO object transformation (push button, toggle, slider, multiple
state, dial, knob and digits are supported) and applying them to a set of components
comprising the design of the object. Using some of the existing components and creating
new ones we have developed the JLOOX SIS visual interface presented in Figure 9
together with the SCR interface code in the background.
Unlike the Altia interface the JLOOX-SCR interface code can be created to be very
generic, without any references to the actual names of the objects in the design. The
constructor of the SimulatorInterface class queries the SCR simulator for all functions
contained in the SCR specification, and connects them with the appropriate JLOOX
visual objects. The convention followed in this example is that a single variable
corresponds to a singe visual object and their name is the same. However, this can be
modified to allow multiple visual objects to represent the same value. By following a
convention their name will have a prefix that is the same as the variable name and a
suffix that will differentiate them. Consequently, the developed JLOOX-SCR interface
code can be reused without any changes to drive all visual interfaces that have been built
using the same convention.
It is important to note that the largest part of the code in the SimulatorInterface class is
for handling type changes between different types of SCR variables and different types of
visual components. We expect that further changes and improvements in this code will be
needed and it would be useful to have a class that can convert between different types of
variables just for this purpose.
The summary of our experience with JLOOX is that it is much better suited for
visualization of SCR specifications than Altia. Generic code can be developed to drive
any design developed according to predefined naming conventions for the visual objects.
Also, the created objects can be easily encapsulated in Java beans and imported into the
SCR simulator palette.
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Figure 20: JLOOX SIS Visual Interface.

6.1.3. ILOG JViews
ILOG JViews [79] follows the same principles of visual interface creation as the previous
two described packages. It has a Composer application which is used to create visual
interface designs and dynamic objects (they are called “prototypes” in ILOG JViews).
There is a set of pre-existing objects, but just like the JLOOX package, it cannot be
compared with the Altia libraries. However, just like the JLOOX, the ease of the creation
of the new objects and the ease of the modification of the existing objects is much better
than the Altia Designer. Figure 10 displays the Composer with the meter object that we
have created to mimic the JLOOX design.
The creation of prototypes is very straight-forward and intuitive by using the provided
wizards. The designer specifies the properties of the prototypes and describes the
graphical effects that are performed when the properties are changed, as well as the user
interactions with the prototypes and their effect on the properties. Everything is done
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visually without any additional programming. Another very important feature of ILOG
JViews package is that it provides automatic Java Bean encapsulation of the designer
prototypes. Exported prototypes can be added to the SCR simulator palette. This is one of
the features that we find particularly useful.
The connections between the different prototypes and to the external variables are created
with the Connection tool by drawing a line between the connected components and
assigning selecting the properties that will be communicated. The connections follow a
publisher-subscriber paradigm; a change in a property that has subscribers will notify
them and publish the new value. The connection to the external environment is done
through special objects called ValueSources. There can be one or more ValueSources that
can receive notifications when some of the prototype properties are changed by the user
interaction, or send new values to the prototypes. Figure 21 presents our designed visual
interface for the SIS specification with one ValueSource. Unfortunately, the
ValueSources are placed in the top left corner of the design and cannot be moved around.
For design clarity it would be best to group different types of SCR variables with
particular ValueSource (e.g. ValueSource for monitored variables, ValueSource for
controlled variables) and to be able to move them around because, usually, similar types
of variables are placed close to each other in the visual designs.
We have implemented an interface for designed visualization to the SCR specification
simulator. It is important to note that we do not need any additional object naming
conventions, than we needed in the JLOOX case, because of the publisher-subscriber
paradigm. Multiple objects can subscribe to the same SCR variable, or one object can
subscribe to receive or send updates to multiple SCR variables.
The constructor of the SimulatorInterface class implements the opposite strategy of the
one used in the JLOOX example for initialization and connection of the SCR variables
with the visual interface, by first querying the visual design for the variables that are
visualized. Depending on the size of the specification and the number of visualized
variables this strategy might be better because usually not all SCR variables are
represented by some objects in the visual interface.
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Figure 22: ILOG JViews SIS visual interface.
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Another important feature of the ILOG JViews package is that it provides a conversion
class between different Java objects so that consequently the code for the SCR interface
is much shorter and intuitive. Figure 22 presents the developed visual interface connected
to the SCR generated Java code for the Safety Injection specification.
We used the Java Bean wizard and exported the meter object in order to add it to the SCR
simulator palette. A small amount of programming work is needed here because the Java
Beans components are unaware about the SCR environment. For any such Java Bean
component (created with the ILOG JViews, purchased, or programmed) we will need to
create a SCR wrapper that will allow the bean to interact with the SCR simulator
environment. Figure 23 presents the SCR simulator palette with the ILOG JViews Meter
object, and the created visual interface for the Safety Injection specification by using this
object.

Figure 23: SCR simulator palette with the ILOG JViews Meter object.

Dejan Desovski

Chapter 6: Visual Interfaces

80

6.2. Tracking the Coverage during Simulation

The SCR simulator can execute the developed specification, thus providing us with
testing capabilities. Although this feature has been implemented for a long time, testing
has not been explored for the purpose of verification. This is mainly because the input
spaces of moderate systems are enormous and the complete coverage of the input space
of the model is impossible. Testing is used to prove the existence of errors, and cannot be
used to prove their absence. Despite these problems, testing is the most used QA
technique in the industry because it is easy to perform the actual tests. Recent papers in
the area propose how to use model checking for automatic test case generation [4][5].
By using one of the developed visual interfaces, during testing we discovered a fault in
the FPE (Fault Protection Engine) specification [4] developed in a joint project of NASA
and NRL. Performing testing with these interfaces would allow the users to focus on the
expected behavior of the system, providing significant evidence of the correctness of the
specification. This research extends our previous research presented in [71] about using
visualizations for validation of requirement specifications.
We implemented a prototype tool to track the test coverage for SCR specifications. In
Figure 24 we present a visual interface for the Safety Injection specification running in
the SCR simulator. While the user runs the simulator, the induced branch coverage is
calculated and presented in the lower left corner. When the user completes a simulation,
the detailed information is presented about which cases were not covered, and whether
they are true of false coverage cases, for each table of the specification.
The coverage measures obtained during testing by the domain experts provide some
information about the correspondence between the specification and the actual system in
the following sense: if there are parts of the specification which have not been covered, it
is possible that we have over-specified these aspects of the system. We would need to
consult the domain expert whether these parts need to be removed, or if further test cases
which are representative for these parts of the system can be developed.
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Our tool saves the executed test sequences, and they can be later used for certification of
the developed executable code, or for the testing and validation of the specification as it
evolves.

Figure 24: Prototype tool for tracking the coverage of the executed simulation.
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Chapter 7
Case Study

We demonstrate our methodology on an SCR specification of Personnel Access Control
System (PACS), originally described in a prose requirements document from the National
Security Agency [74]. The SCR specification (given in Appendix A.1.) had been
originally developed as an example on how to write high quality formal requirements
specification.
A high quality requirements specification must not only be easy to understand and
change, precise, and unambiguous, it must also avoid implementation bias. In addition, it
should be complete and consistent and organized as a reference document. Unfortunately,
requirements specifications with all of these attributes are extremely rare. The original
specification was developed focusing on two important aspects of a high quality
requirements specification: the formulation of a set of system modes, which make the
specification more concise and easier to understand, and the design of the specifications
for ease of change.
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7.1. PACS Description

PACS checks information on magnetic cards and uses PIN numbers to limit physical
access to a restricted area to authorized users. To gain access, the user swipes an ID card
containing the user's name and Social Security Number (SSN) through a card reader.
After using its database of names and SSNs to validate that the user has the required
access privileges, the system instructs the user to enter a four-digit personal identification
number (PIN). If the entered PIN matches a stored PIN in the system database, PACS
allows the user to enter the restricted area through a gate. To guide the user through this
process, the PACS displays messages on a single-line display screen. A security officer
monitors and controls the PACS using a console with the second single-line display
screen, an alarm, a reset button, and a gate override button.
To initiate the validation process, the PACS displays the message “Insert Card” on the
user display. Upon detecting a card swipe it validates the user name and SSN. If the card
is valid, the PACS displays “Enter PIN.” If the card is unreadable or the information on
the card fails to match the information in the systems database, the PACS displays
“Retry” for a maximum of three tries. If after three tries the user's card is still invalid or
there is no match, the system displays “See Officer” on both the user’s display and the
officer’s display, and turns on an alarm (either a sound or a light) on the officer's console.
Before system operation can resume, the officer must reset the PACS by pushing the
reset button. The user, who also has three tries to enter a PIN, has a maximum of five
seconds to enter each of the four digits before the PACS displays the “Invalid PIN”
message. If an invalid PIN is entered three times or the time limit is exceeded, the system
displays “See Officer” on both the user and the officer display. After receiving a valid
PIN, PACS unlocks the gate and instructs the user to “Please Proceed.” After 10 seconds,
the system automatically closes the gate and resets itself for the next user.
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Figure 25: Visual Interface of the PACS specification.

Figure 25 presents a Visual Interface of the PACS system, which was used during the
development of the specification.

7.2. Applying the Decomposition Procedure
The initial application of our decomposition algorithm on the PACS dependency graph
was not successful in the sense that it did not identify the components we were expecting.
Namely, from [74] we can see that PACS system has at least two components: the card
reader and the PIN reader. Our decomposition heuristic could not detect these two
components from the original specification leading to the conclusion that information
hiding principles (advocated by Parnas et al. in [15]) have not been followed. After the
careful review of the original specification and its dependency graph, we concluded that
there are several factors limiting the decomposability of this specification:


The behavior of the card reader is specified in the system status mode table,
instead of being encapsulated as a separate component;



The behavior of the PIN reader is separated from the system status mode table,
however its information hiding can be improved (e.g. there are variables which
are not completely encapsulated, adding unnecessary dependencies);
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The specification contains two variables which directly affect most of the other
variables in the system (mReset and mOverride). Although the behavior
introduced by these two variables is simple (e.g. reset of all the variables in the
system by mReset), they introduce additional dependency links that our algorithm
cannot break.

To remedy the encapsulation problems, we refactored the original specification by
applying the following principles:
1)

Define term variables to represent the result of the operation of each component,
thus encapsulating the internal component behavior.

2)

Use mode classes for component specification.

3)

Use the defined term variables when referring to the results of other components
(do not break the encapsulation and information hiding by using internal
component variables).

4)

Avoid the use of global variables.

To break the dependencies on the global variables, we had to remove them from the
specification. There are several ways this could be done in the future – we can denote
these variables as global and relax the cost of the dependencies links that are connected to
them, allowing the decomposition algorithm to break these links.
For the PACS specification, we defined term variables tCardValid and tPINValid to
encapsulate the behavior of the two components. Both of them have the same domain
{Unknown, Yes, No, Error} denoting that, for example, tCardValid is either Unknown –
we do not currently know the result of the card entry and validation, Yes - the card is
successfully swiped and validated, No –the card is not valid, or Error – the user exceeded
the number of allowed non-valid swipes. The Error state allows us to encapsulate the
tNumCReads variable, counting the number of non-valid swipes within the component.
For each component we used a mode class (mcCard and mcPIN), which simplifies the
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specification of their behavior. The system mode status table mcStatus and the other
external variables to the components are changed only to refer to the defined terms.
Input the name of the dependencies file:
PACS2NewDependencies.dg
Cut 1: cost = 1
mcCard_OUT, mcCard_IN, mCardInput_OUT, mCardInput_IN, mCardValid_OUT,
mCardValid_IN, tCardValid_OUT, tNumCReads_OUT, tNumCReads_IN,
Cut 2: cost = 1
mcPIN_OUT, mcPIN_IN, mDigit1_OUT, mDigit1_IN, mDigit2_OUT, mDigit2_IN,
mDigit3_OUT, mDigit3_IN, mDigit4_OUT, mDigit4_IN, mPINValid_OUT,
mPINValid_IN, tNumPReads_OUT, tNumPReads_IN, tPINValid_OUT,
the rest of the system:
mcStatus_OUT, mcStatus_IN, cGate_OUT, cGate_IN, cGuardAlarm_OUT,
cGuardAlarm_IN, cGuardDisplay_OUT, cGuardDisplay_IN, cUserDisplay_OUT,
cUserDisplay_IN, mGate_OUT, mGate_IN, tCardValid_IN, tPINValid_IN,
No more cuts.

Figure 26: Decomposition of the refactored PACS specification.

After this refactoring, our decomposition algorithm correctly identified the two
components of the system, leaving only the control component (Figure 26).
These changes in the operational part of the specification imply only small changes in the
specification of properties. Because we removed the mReset and mOverride variables, we
had to remove one of the properties which referred to these variables. The rest of the
properties were either unchanged or only had replacement of the mCardValid or
mPINValid monitored variables, with the corresponding term variables tCardValid and
tPINValid.
We used the SPIN model checker with default options and increased the depth limit to
180000 in order to achieve complete verification to verify all properties for the complete
refactored PACS specification (Appendix A.2.). This took 35.405 seconds and required
553.342 MB of memory on a machine with Pentium M 1.5GHz processor and 1GB of
RAM.
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7.3. Applying the compositional verification strategy

Step 1 of our verification strategy gives the following partitioning of the variables:
V1 ={mCardValid, mCardInput, tNumCReads, mcCard, tCardValid},
V2 ={mDigit1, mDigit2, mDigit3, mDigit4, mPINValid, mcPIN, tNumPReads, tPINValid}
V3 ={mGate, mcStatus, cGuardAlaram, cGuardDisplay, cGate, cUserDisplay}

In step 2, we derived the three components presented in Figure 27, Figure 28, and Figure
29. In the figures, we omitted the variables on which the components do not have explicit
dependency. Since the properties of interests for each component are only those that
depend on the variables within the component, the variables from the set V – Vi are going
to be abstracted by applying the abstraction method 1 described in Section 4.1.

Figure 27: The Card reading component.

Figure 28: The PIN-Reading component.
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Figure 29: The Control component.

Next, in step 3 we need to prove the properties that hold for the identified components.
The verification of the Control component (Figure 29) with SPIN took 0.093 seconds and
required 2.827MB of memory, establishing the following invariants for the system:
AlarmStatus: (cGuardAlarm = On) <=> (cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer)
CardSuccess: ((cUserDisplay = InsertCard OR cUserDisplay = Retry) AND mcStatus =
CheckCard AND @T(tCardValid = Yes)) => (cUserDisplay' = EnterPIN)
GateStatus: (cUserDisplay = PleaseProceed) <=> (cGate = Open)
PINSuccess: ((cUserDisplay = EnterPIN OR cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN) AND mcStatus
= CheckPIN AND @T(tPINValid = Yes)) => (cUserDisplay' = PleaseProceed)
Safety: (cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer) <=> (cGuardDisplay = SeeOfficer).
The verification of the Card-Reading component takes 0.062 seconds and requires
2.724MB of memory, establishing the following invariants for the system:
CardErrors: (mcStatus = CheckCard AND @T(tCardValid = No)) => (tNumCReads' =
tNumCReads + 1)
NumCardErrors: (tNumCReads <= MaxCardError).
Similarly, the verification of the PIN-Reading component takes 2.327 seconds and
requires 55.320MB of memory, establishing the following properties as invariants:
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NumPINErrors: (tNumPReads <= MaxPINError)
PINErrors: (mcStatus = CheckPIN AND @T(tPINValid = No)) => (tNumPReads' =
tNumPReads + 1).
We should note that the verification of the PIN-Reading component requires most
resources, because its state space is larger. Also, note that the demonstrated CardErrors
and PINErrors invariants are stronger than the ones included in the system specification
in Appendix A.2.
Consequently, by applying step 3 of our verification strategy, we verified 9 out of the 14
invariants, in total of 2.482 seconds and requiring maximum 55.320MB of memory,
which is for an order of magnitude more efficient than performing verification on the
complete system.
The rest of the properties include variables that span across more than one component.
We were not successful in applying the deduction rules in step 4 to prove the remaining 5
properties, partly because the automated translation from the SCR toolset to Promela
currently does not handle assumptions. The results in using Salsa and SMV suggest that
the problem in verification of these 5 properties is the over-approximation introduced by
the decomposition. We would need to come up with additional invariants or rewrite these
properties, but that was not our goal in this study.
CardDisplay1: (tNumCReads > 0 AND tNumCReads < MaxCardError) <=>
(cUserDisplay = Retry)
CardDisplay2: (tNumCReads = MaxCardError) => (cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer)
PINDisplay1: (tNumPReads > 0 AND tNumPReads < MaxPINError) <=> (cUserDisplay
= InvalidPIN)
PINDisplay2: (tNumPReads = MaxPINError) => (cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer)
PINEntry: (@C(tPINValid) => (mcStatus = CheckPIN))
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By using step 5 of our strategy and creating unions of components, we are successful in
verifying the rest of the properties. Combining the Card-Read and Control components
allows verification of the CardDisplay1 and CardDisplay2 properties in 0.124 seconds
with 3.544MB of memory. More demanding is the union of the PIN-Read and Control
components, which allows verification of the remaining 3 properties in 16.734 seconds
and 273.060MB or memory. Table 12 summarizes the results of the case study.
Table 12: The resources needed and number of verified properties for each component.
Module

Complete PACS
Control
Card Read
PIN Read
Card Read + Control
PIN Read + Control

Time (seconds) Memory (MB) Properties Proven

35.405
0.093
0.062
2.327
0.124
16.734

553.342
2.827
2.724
55.320
3.544
273.060

14
5
2
2
2
3
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In order to perform verification and validation of complex system specifications, it is
beneficial to identify the sub-components, apply abstraction and compositional
verification methods. Our approach is based on the hypothesis that specification
components can be automatically identified at the points that have minimal coupling with
the rest of the system. In the case of SCR specifications, these points are presented by the
variables in the specification, and coupling appears in the dependency graph. Applying
the minimum cut algorithms, we can identify these points in the graph and perform
specification decomposition.
We observed that our hypothesis holds true for specifications that follow the principle of
information hiding. The proposed algorithms are polynomial and therefore applicable to
large specifications. We demonstrated that our algorithm automates the abstraction
procedure for removal of detailed monitored variables in the SCR specifications.
We presented the theoretical framework for compositional verification of the SCR
specification properties. The identified deduction rules are sound, but incomplete in
general, possibly requiring additional inductive invariants that should be used to prove
some of the system invariants. Although we are focusing on the SCR requirements
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model, the same approach should be applicable to similar formal models (e.g. Reactive
Modules [69]), and this is one of the subjects for future research.
Assuming that the specification under review is decomposable, we proposed verification
strategy that provides significant reductions in the required time and memory. Each
derived component represents an abstraction of the complete system; however, it usually
allows additional behaviors that might invalidate the properties we would like to prove.
The min-cut decomposition approach minimizes the dependency of a single component
on external variables. Our approach considers components of the specification (i.e. sets of
variables) which have low coupling and limited information exchange with the rest of the
specification. We specify properties at component level, prove that they are system
invariants, and use them in the certification process. This does not always work, because
of the additional behavior that the abstract components might have when considered by
themselves. The invariants proven this way can be used to prove additional invariants by
using the strengthening compositional and assume-guarantee rules.
During our experiments with the PACS system, we have identified the basic principles
that need to be followed when writing decomposable SCR specifications. They echo the
long time advocated principles of modularity, encapsulation, and information hiding in
the software development process:
1) Define component border variables that will represent the result of the operation
of each component, thus enabling encapsulation of the internal component
behavior. In SCR models, these variables are represented as term variables.
2) Use variables that capture the internal state of the system modules in order to
achieve specification modularity and ease of change. In SCR models, these
variables are represented as mode class variables.
3) Use the defined border variables (from 1) when referring to the results of other
components (do not break the encapsulation by using internal component
variables).
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4) Avoid the use of global variables, or break the dependencies caused by them.
The results of the PACS case study demonstrate the advantages of decomposable
specifications. Following the proposed verification strategy we achieved significant
reduction in time and memory required for automated verification. The strategy allows us
to perform the verification component by component, and combine the obtained results.

8.1. Future Work
In the future, we would like to further demonstrate the effectiveness of our componentbased verification methodology by applying it to larger software models. Important
aspect of this work would be to formally identify the design principles that lead to
decomposable and easily verifiable formal software models.
We presented our methodology and tools for random testing of formal software models.
Although simple, random testing approach is effective in the early phases of formal
modeling. It identifies faults and inconsistencies between the operational and the
property-based description of the system. Because of the inherent incompleteness of the
random testing, we need to augment our tools by using complete verification tools, like
SPIN, in the later phases of the model development. We, however, note that this is not
always feasible due to the large state spaces of practical software systems; current
complete model-checking approaches often hit the state explosion barrier and cannot be
applied. For this purpose, we plan to investigate the proposed test coverage metrics for
SCR formal models and, if necessary, develop comprehensive coverage metrics. One
direction is to use different input generation strategies, which would explore the structure
of the model more uniformly. The other goal is to modify our random search
methodology to automatically explore uncovered parts of the model leading to higher
assurance in the correctness of the model under study.
Current requirements validation techniques do not address the problem of demonstrating
the correctness of the formalization phase satisfactorily. This problem is especially
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significant in the realm of high assurance systems. Current techniques do not provide
friendly interfaces for domain experts although they have the most complete knowledge
of the system being built. We believe that validation techniques based on reasoning about
symbolic system representation do not take advantage of the human cognitive process.
These problems can be addressed in future by having a suitable visual interface in which
symbolic formulas can be projected, visualized, and validated.
The SCR method addresses the validation problem with a number of approaches. The
underlying model is easy to understand and uses compositional approach in building the
model. The automated consistency and completeness checks ensure that the defined
functions are deterministic and well defined. Different model checkers, theorem provers,
and the SCR simulator can be used for the validation of the developed specifications.
There are several benefits in this approach. Creating a visual interface will unavoidably
increase the time/resources required in the formalization phase, and thus if some users of
the tool already have experience in using some visualization library, they can reuse this
knowledge and the set of developed visual components. We also believe that the benefit
of having visual interface in the validation process will compensate the initial higher cost.
The developed specification visualizations can be connected to be driven not just by the
SCR specification, but also by different implementations or specifications of the same
system, and thus be used in cross validation.
Another subject that we would like to explore in the future is the input domain
partitioning based on SCR specifications. If we are given an internal state of an SCR
model, it induces a partition in the input space. In other words, it should be possible to
generate input state partitions that do (or do not) change the value of the state variables.
This result may lead towards more efficient testing strategies for SCR models by
obtaining complete equivalence partitioning of the input space.
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Appendix
A.1. Original PACS SCR specification
Type Dictionary
Name
Base Type Units Legal Values
yAlarm
Enumerated
On, Off
yGate
Enumerated
Open, Closed
yGuardDisplay Enumerated
Blank, SeeOfficer
yKeys
Enumerated
Blank, Number, Delete
InsertCard, Retry, EnterPIN, InvalidPIN, PleaseProceed,
yUserDisplay Enumerated
SeeOfficer

Comment

Mode Class Dictionary
Name

Modes

mcPIN

Init, GetDigit1, GetDigit2, GetDigit3, GetDigit4
EnterCard, CheckCard, EnterPIN, CheckPIN, Proceed, ReEnterCard,
mcStatus
ReEnterPIN, Error, Override
Constant Dictionary
Type
Value
Integer
3
Integer
3

Name
MaxCardError
MaxPINError

Name
mCardInput
mCardValid
mDigit1
mDigit2
mDigit3
mDigit4
mGate
mOverride
mPINValid
mReset

Name
mPINInput
tNumCReads
tNumPReads

Type
Boolean
Boolean
yKeys
yKeys
yKeys
yKeys
yGate
Boolean
Boolean
Boolean

Type
Boolean
Integer
Integer

Comment

EnterCard

Comment

Monitored Variable Dictionary
Initial Value
Accuracy
FALSE
FALSE
Blank
Blank
Blank
Blank
Closed
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE

Term Dictionary
Initial Value
FALSE
0
0

Initial
Mode
Init

Accuracy

Comment

Comment
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Controlled Variable Dictionary
Type
Initial Value
yGate
Closed
yAlarm
Off
yGuardDisplay
Blank
yUserDisplay
InsertCard

Name
cGate
cGuardAlarm
cGuardDisplay
cUserDisplay
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Accuracy

Comment

Assertion Dictionary

AlarmStatus

Proof
Source
Result
User -

CardDisplay1

User

-

CardDisplay2

User

-

CardErrors

User

-

CardSuccess

User

-

GateStatus
User
NumCardErrors User
NumPINErrors User

-

PINDisplay1

User

-

PINDisplay2

User

-

PINEntry

User

-

PINErrors

User

-

PINSuccess

User

-

Reset

User

-

Safety

User

-

Name

Expression

Comment

(cGuardAlarm = On) <=> (cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer)
(tNumCReads > 0 AND tNumCReads < MaxCardError) <=>
(cUserDisplay = Retry)
(tNumCReads = MaxCardError) => (cUserDisplay =
SeeOfficer)
((cUserDisplay = InsertCard OR cUserDisplay = Retry)
AND mcStatus = CheckCard AND @F(mCardValid)) =>
(tNumCReads' = tNumCReads + 1)
((cUserDisplay = InsertCard OR cUserDisplay = Retry)
AND mcStatus = CheckCard AND @T(mCardValid)) =>
(cUserDisplay' = EnterPIN)
(cUserDisplay = PleaseProceed) <=> (cGate = Open)
(tNumCReads <= MaxCardError)
(tNumPReads <= MaxPINError)
(tNumPReads > 0 AND tNumPReads < MaxPINError) <=>
(cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN)
(tNumPReads = MaxPINError) => (cUserDisplay =
SeeOfficer)
(@C(mPINInput) => (mcStatus = EnterPIN OR mcStatus =
ReEnterPIN))
((cUserDisplay = EnterPIN OR cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN)
AND mcStatus = CheckPIN AND @F(mPINValid)) =>
(tNumPReads' = tNumPReads + 1)
((cUserDisplay = EnterPIN OR cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN)
AND mcStatus = CheckPIN AND @T(mPINValid)) =>
(cUserDisplay' = PleaseProceed)
(@C(mReset)) => (cUserDisplay' = InsertCard)
(cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer) <=> (cGuardDisplay =
SeeOfficer)

Assumption Dictionary
Name
Expression
GateOpen @T(mGate = Open) => (cGate = Open)
PINInput @C(mPINInput) => (mcPIN = GetDigit4 AND @T(mDigit4 = Number))

Comment
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cGate =

cGate Condition Function
Conditions
mcStatus = Proceed OR mcStatus =
NOT (mcStatus = Proceed OR mcStatus =
Override
Override)
Open
Closed

cGuardAlarm =

cGuardAlarm Condition Function
Conditions
mcStatus = Error
NOT (mcStatus = Error)
On
Off

cGuardDisplay' =

cGuardDisplay Event Function
Events
@T(mcStatus = EnterCard) OR @T(mcStatus = Override)
Blank

cUserDisplay' =

@T(mcStatus = Error)
SeeOfficer

cUserDisplay Event Function
Events
@T(mcStatus @T(mcStatus @T(mcStatus @T(mcStatus @T(mcStatus @T(mcStatus
= EnterCard) =
= EnterPIN) =
= Error)
= Proceed)
ReEnterCard)
ReEnterPIN) OR
@T(mcStatus
= Override)
InsertCard
Retry
EnterPIN
InvalidPIN PleaseProceed SeeOfficer
mcPIN Mode Transition Function

Source Mode(s)
Init

GetDigit1
GetDigit2
GetDigit2
GetDigit3
GetDigit3
GetDigit4
GetDigit4
GetDigit1, GetDigit2,
GetDigit3, GetDigit4

Events
@T(mCardValid) WHEN (mcStatus = CheckCard)
OR @F(mPINValid) WHEN (mcStatus = CheckPIN
AND tNumPReads < MaxPINError - 1)
@T(mDigit1 = Number)
@T(mDigit2 = Number)
@T(mDigit2 = Delete)
@T(mDigit3 = Number)
@T(mDigit3 = Delete)
@T(mDigit4 = Number)
@T(mDigit4 = Delete)
@C(mReset)

Destination Mode
GetDigit1

GetDigit2
GetDigit3
GetDigit1
GetDigit4
GetDigit2
Init
GetDigit3
Init
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mcStatus Mode Transition Function
Source Mode(s)
EnterCard
CheckCard
EnterPIN
CheckPIN
Proceed
CheckCard
ReEnterCard
CheckCard
CheckPIN
ReEnterPIN
CheckPIN
Error
Override
EnterCard, CheckCard,
EnterPIN, CheckPIN,
ReEnterCard,
ReEnterPIN, Error,
Override, Proceed

mPINInput' =

Modes for
mcStatus
CheckCard
Error
ReEnterCard
tNumCReads' =

Modes for
mcStatus
CheckPIN
Error
ReEnterPIN
tNumPReads' =

Events
@C(mCardInput)
@T(mCardValid)
@C(mPINInput)
@T(mPINValid)
@T(mGate = Closed)
@F(mCardValid) WHEN (tNumCReads <
MaxCardError - 1)
@C(mCardInput)
@F(mCardValid) WHEN (tNumCReads =
MaxCardError - 1)
@F(mPINValid) WHEN (tNumPReads <
MaxPINError - 1)
@C(mPINInput)
@F(mPINValid) WHEN (tNumPReads =
MaxPINError - 1)
@C(mOverride)
@T(mGate = Closed)
@C(mReset)

Destination Mode
CheckCard
EnterPIN
CheckPIN
Proceed
EnterCard
ReEnterCard
CheckCard
Error
ReEnterPIN
CheckPIN
Error
Override
EnterCard
EnterCard

mPINInput Event Function
Events
@T(mDigit4 = Number) WHEN (mcPIN = GetDigit4)
NOT mPINInput
tNumCReads Event Function
Events
@T(mCardValid) OR @C(mReset)
@C(mOverride) OR @C(mReset)
@C(mReset)
0

@F(mCardValid)
NEVER
NEVER
tNumCReads + 1

tNumPReads Event Function
Events
@T(mPINValid) OR @C(mReset)
@C(mOverride) OR @C(mReset)
@C(mReset)
0

@F(mPINValid)
NEVER
NEVER
tNumPReads + 1
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A.2. Redesigned PACS SCR specification
Type Dictionary
Name
Base Type Units Legal Values
yAlarm
Enumerated
On, Off
yGate
Enumerated
Open, Closed
yGuardDisplay Enumerated
Blank, SeeOfficer
yKeys
Enumerated
Blank, Number, Delete
InsertCard, Retry, EnterPIN, InvalidPIN, PleaseProceed,
yUserDisplay Enumerated
SeeOfficer
yValid
Enumerated
Unknown, Yes, No, Error

Comment

Mode Class Dictionary
Name
mcCard
mcPIN
mcStatus

Modes
WaitSwap, ReadData, Error
GetDigit1, GetDigit2, GetDigit3, GetDigit4, CheckPIN, Error
CheckCard, CheckPIN, Proceed, Error
Constant Dictionary
Type
Value
Integer
3
Integer
3

Name
MaxCardError
MaxPINError

Name
mCardInput
mCardValid
mDigit1
mDigit2
mDigit3
mDigit4
mGate
mPINValid

Name
tCardValid
tNumCReads
tNumPReads
tPINValid

Type
Boolean
Boolean
yKeys
yKeys
yKeys
yKeys
yGate
Boolean

Type
yValid
Integer
Integer
yValid

Comment

Monitored Variable Dictionary
Initial Value
Accuracy
FALSE
FALSE
Blank
Blank
Blank
Blank
Closed
FALSE
Term Dictionary
Initial Value
Unknown
0
0
Unknown

Initial Mode Comment
WaitSwap
GetDigit1
CheckCard

Accuracy

Comment

Comment
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Type
Initial Value
yGate
Closed
yAlarm
Off
yGuardDisplay
Blank
yUserDisplay
InsertCard

Name
cGate
cGuardAlarm
cGuardDisplay
cUserDisplay
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Accuracy

Comment

Assertion Dictionary

AlarmStatus

Proof
Source
Result
User -

CardDisplay1

User

-

CardDisplay2

User

-

CardErrors

User

-

CardSuccess

User

-

GateStatus
User
NumCardErrors User
NumPINErrors User

-

PINDisplay1

User

-

PINDisplay2

User

-

PINEntry

User

-

PINErrors

User

-

PINSuccess

User

-

Safety

User

-

Name

Name
GateOpen

cGate =

Expression

Comment

(cGuardAlarm = On) <=> (cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer)
(tNumCReads > 0 AND tNumCReads < MaxCardError) <=>
(cUserDisplay = Retry)
(tNumCReads = MaxCardError) => (cUserDisplay =
SeeOfficer)
((cUserDisplay = InsertCard OR cUserDisplay = Retry)
AND mcStatus = CheckCard AND @T(tCardValid = No))
=> (tNumCReads' = tNumCReads + 1)
((cUserDisplay = InsertCard OR cUserDisplay = Retry)
AND mcStatus = CheckCard AND @T(tCardValid = Yes))
=> (cUserDisplay' = EnterPIN)
(cUserDisplay = PleaseProceed) <=> (cGate = Open)
(tNumCReads <= MaxCardError)
(tNumPReads <= MaxPINError)
(tNumPReads > 0 AND tNumPReads < MaxPINError) <=>
(cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN)
(tNumPReads = MaxPINError) => (cUserDisplay =
SeeOfficer)
(@C(tPINValid) => (mcStatus = CheckPIN))
((cUserDisplay = EnterPIN OR cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN)
AND mcStatus = CheckPIN AND @T(tPINValid = No)) =>
(tNumPReads' = tNumPReads + 1)
((cUserDisplay = EnterPIN OR cUserDisplay = InvalidPIN)
AND mcStatus = CheckPIN AND @T(tPINValid = Yes)) =>
(cUserDisplay' = PleaseProceed)
(cUserDisplay = SeeOfficer) <=> (cGuardDisplay =
SeeOfficer)

Assumption Dictionary
Expression
@T(mGate = Open) => (cGate = Open)
cGate Condition Function
Conditions
mcStatus = Proceed
NOT (mcStatus = Proceed)
Open
Closed

Comment
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cGuardAlarm =

cGuardAlarm Condition Function
Conditions
mcStatus = Error
NOT (mcStatus = Error)
On
Off

cGuardDisplay' =

cGuardDisplay Event Function
Events
@T(mcStatus = CheckCard)
@T(mcStatus = Error)
Blank
SeeOfficer

cUserDisplay Event Function
Events
@T(mcStatus @T(tCardValid @T(mcStatus @T(tPINValid @T(mcStatus @T(mcStatus
=
= No) WHEN = CheckPIN) = No) WHEN = Proceed)
= Error)
CheckCard) (mcStatus =
(mcStatus =
CheckCard)
CheckPIN)
cUserDisplay' = InsertCard
Retry
EnterPIN
InvalidPIN
PleaseProceed SeeOfficer

Source Mode(s)
WaitSwap
ReadData
ReadData

Source Mode(s)
GetDigit1
GetDigit2
GetDigit2
GetDigit3
GetDigit3
GetDigit4
GetDigit4
CheckPIN
CheckPIN

mcCard Mode Transition Function
Events
@T(mCardInput) WHEN (mcStatus = CheckCard)
@T(mCardValid) OR @F(mCardValid) WHEN
(tNumCReads < MaxCardError - 1)
@T(tNumCReads = MaxCardError)
mcPIN Mode Transition Function
Events
@T(mDigit1 = Number) WHEN (mcStatus =
CheckPIN)
@T(mDigit2 = Number)
@T(mDigit2 = Delete)
@T(mDigit3 = Number)
@T(mDigit3 = Delete)
@T(mDigit4 = Number)
@T(mDigit4 = Delete)
@T(mPINValid) OR @F(mPINValid) WHEN
(tNumPReads < MaxPINError - 1)
@T(tNumPReads = MaxPINError)

Destination Mode
ReadData
WaitSwap
Error

Destination Mode
GetDigit2
GetDigit3
GetDigit1
GetDigit4
GetDigit2
CheckPIN
GetDigit3
GetDigit1
Error
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mcStatus Mode Transition Function
Source Mode(s)
CheckCard
CheckCard
CheckPIN
CheckPIN
Proceed

tCardValid' =

Events
@T(tCardValid = Yes)
@T(tCardValid = Error)
@T(tPINValid = Yes)
@T(tPINValid = Error)
@T(mGate = Closed)

Destination Mode
CheckPIN
Error
Proceed
Error
CheckCard

tCardValid Event Function
Events
@T(mCardValid)
@F(mCardValid) WHEN @T(tNumCReads = @T(mcCard
WHEN (mcCard = (mcCard = ReadData
MaxCardError)
= ReadData)
ReadData)
AND tNumCReads <
MaxCardError - 1)
Yes
No
Error
Unknown

tNumCReads Event Function
Modes for mcCard
Events
ReadData
@T(mCardValid)
@F(mCardValid)
tNumCReads' =
0
tNumCReads + 1

Modes for mcPIN
CheckPIN
tNumPReads' =

tNumPReads Event Function
Events
@T(mPINValid)
@F(mPINValid)
0
tNumPReads + 1

tPINValid' =

tPINValid Event Function
Events
@T(mPINValid)
@F(mPINValid) WHEN
WHEN (mcPIN =
(mcPIN = CheckPIN and
CheckPIN)
tNumPReads <
MaxPINError - 1)
Yes
No

@T(tNumPReads = @T(mcPIN =
CheckPIN)
MaxPINError)

Error

Unknown

